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Abstract
Organizations of all sizes are vulnerable to critical material supply disruptions. Although
there is a significant body of literature that examines how large entities such as nations and
governments can assess and mitigate criticality, there is very little work that addresses firm-level
criticality in a way that is actionable for businesses. This work uses literature review and case
study analysis to understand the impact of critical material supply risk at the firm level, and to
determine salient internal indicators. A total of 42 criticality studies were reviewed and the
findings were used to develop a framework to assess and monitor criticality risk using internal
firm-specific data. The framework incorporates three categories of risk including product
concept viability, production, and profitability. It also contains four key business functions
including finance, procurement, marketing, and production. These aspects were chosen because
they are relevant to all businesses that produce and sell manufactured goods, and because they
represent dynamics that are within the control of an individual firm. Unlike the global and
national level indicators emphasized in most current research, the indicators proposed in this
research are derived from data such that firms can compile it with reasonable ease. Finally, this
work considers the role of the organization in criticality risk assessment and mitigation through
an examination of the data needed to complete the aforementioned framework and the likely
sources of that information. The findings of this analysis elucidate the gap between internal and
external and micro and macro criticality assessment, as well as provide a framework for firmlevel criticality mitigation.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1.

Background
The extraction and use of raw metals for the production of goods and technologies has

increased by 19 times over the past 100 years. The use of some individual metals, such as
aluminum, has increased by a factor as high as 1000 (Graedel, Barr et al. 2012). Because these
raw materials are used by a rapidly growing global population for a wide range of products,
demand is expected to increase further. The rapid consumption of some of these finite
resources—such as cobalt, rhenium, platinum group metals, and rare earth elements—is
noteworthy because these materials are strategically important for renewable and clean energy
technologies, national defense, numerous technological innovations that improve our daily lives
(e.g., smart phones, laptops, healthcare equipment), and even emerging methods of urban
agriculture that require artificial lighting to produce food. Referred to as critical materials, these
minerals and metals are vulnerable to supply disruptions and price volatility. In order to mitigate
risk and promote the sustainable development of the technologies that depend upon them,
demand for critical materials must be monitored and supply must be managed. In addition to the
environmental and social benefits of critical material-dependent products such as solar panels,
wind turbines, and electric vehicles, there are financial benefits. Many economies, including the
U.S., are heavily dependent on critical raw materials for manufacturing as well as the underlying
science and technology innovations that make them competitive. To maintain the innovation and
economic growth that drives society forward and makes it possible for future generations to
enjoy the same or better quality of life as the current generation, the firms that rely on critical
materials need to understand and be able to mitigate their risk.
The precise definition of a critical material varies but here we focus on two dimensions
for firms: (a) supply disruptions and (b) high economic and/or strategic importance.
Supply Disruption: Critical material supply disruptions are caused by many different and
often interdependent dynamics. For example, scarcity concerns the physical availability of
materials and can be measured by factors such as crustal abundance, reserve levels, mine
production, static depletion times, and national stockpiles. Other factors that can cause supply
disruption include natural disasters, politics, conflict, production bottlenecks, and lack of
producer diversity.
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Some materials have codependence with primary production, for example cobalt and
tellurium are commercially obtained as a byproduct of copper mining. This can cause supply
issues as an increase in demand of the byproduct material may not have an economic impact on
the production of the parent material (Bustamante and Gaustad 2014). Import reliance and lack
of producer diversity may exacerbate other supply issues (Bustamante and Gaustad 2014) (Buijs
and Sievers 2011) (Gunn 2014). Geopolitical risk is defined as political and governance activity
across the globe that may restrict or limit critical material availability. Components of this
category may include conflict, political instability, violence, government trade policies and
interventions, corruption, and government effectiveness.
Volatility in demand may cause supply risk due to unbalanced markets, competing
technology demand, and artificial inventory fluctuations across the supply chain (i.e. the
bullwhip effect). Ecological damage that occurs as a result of raw material extraction and
processing, such as soil degradation, air pollution, water contamination, and loss of biodiversity
may cause supply risk issues if producing firms cannot keep up with regulatory compliance.
For each cause of supply disruptions there are multiple indicators used to identify supply
risk. Achzet and Helbig (2013) found that the most frequently observed indicators are country
risk, country production concentration, depletion time, and by-product dependency. The next
most frequently observed indicators are company concentration in mining corporations, demand
growth projections followed by recycling and recyclability, substitutability, import dependence,
and commodity prices (Achzet and Helbig 2013). Less common indicators include things such
as production costs in extraction, stock keeping, mine/refinery capacity, future market capacity,
and investment in mining (Achzet and Helbig 2013).
Economic and Strategic Importance: A key impact of critical material supply disruption is
market vulnerability to sudden price spikes (Duclos, Otto et al. 2010) (Graedel, Barr et al. 2012).
Price spikes affect firm competitiveness by creating uncertainty in costs, product pricing,
earnings, and credit availability, thus affecting short-term profitability and long-term survival
(Agarwal, Ofori et al. 2012). Surveys and reports published by leading business consulting firms
highlight this as a growing concern among modern businesses and the academic literature
supports these findings (Agarwal, Ofori et al. 2012) (Schoolderman and Mathlener 2011).
Additional studies (e.g. (Chapman, Christopher et al. 2002) (Helferich and Cook 2002) (Martha
and Subbakrishna 2002)), have also reported costly consequences of disruptions.
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Recent emphasis on lean supply chain management principles in corporations makes firms
more vulnerable to supply disruptions because they tend to have limited stockpiles. It also poses
significant challenges for supply chain managers tasked with maintaining operational efficiencies
while also increasing supply resilience (Hendricks and Singhal 2005a). Material shortages can
slow or halt production in manufacturing plants, increase costs, and quickly diminish a firm’s
competitive advantage and revenue. For example, in early 2000 a phone chip supply disruption
caused by a fire in a manufacturing plant impacted two companies, Nokia and Ericsson. Nokia
responded aggressively to the supply disruption by securing alternate suppliers, modifying
product designs to accommodate different chips, and communicating regularly with the original
manufacturer. Ericsson was slow to take action and therefore unable to expediently secure an
alternate supplier. As a result, the company sustained an estimated revenue loss of $400 million
and soon after exited the consumer cell phone market (Sheffi and Rice Jr 2005).
As demonstrated in the Ericsson case, negative consequences of critical material supply
disruptions in sectors such as manufacturing, transportation, electric power, and
telecommunications can be enduring and can impact multiple business sectors. In a study of
supply chain disruptions in publicly traded firms, Hendricks and Singhal found that stock
returns, share price volatility, and profitability are all negatively impacted by supply disruptions
(Hendricks and Singhal 2005a, Hendricks and Singhal 2005b). Across nearly 800 disruptions
analyzed, stock returns were found to drop, on average, 33% to 40% over a three year time
period and, notably, Hendricks and Singhal assert that this underperformance can be observed in
the year prior to the supply disruption (Hendricks and Singhal 2005a). Share prices were found
to have 13.5% higher volatility in the year following the supply disruption than in the year prior
to the disruption (Hendricks and Singhal 2005a). In terms of impact to firm profitability,
Hendricks and Singhal reported that, on average, firms that experienced a supply disruption
faced an operating income decrease of 107%, a drop in return on sales of 114%, a drop in return
on assets of 93%, 7% lower sales growth, 11% growth in cost, and 14% growth in inventories
(Hendricks and Singhal 2005b).
In terms of recovery, Hendricks and Singhal found that it can take two or more years to
return to the performance levels prior to a disruption (Hendricks and Singhal 2005a). Some
firms never return to the same performance levels that existed prior to the disruption (Sheffi and
Rice Jr 2005). Additionally, firms lack clear contingency plans and well-defined roles for
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managing disruptions. Mitroff and Alpaslan assessed the crisis readiness of Fortune 500
companies over two decades and found that 75% to 95% of companies analyzed were not
prepared for any kind of disruptive event (Mitroff and Alpaslan 2003). This was further
corroborated by Hillman and Keltz (Hillman and Keltz 2007).
Commonly cited criticality mitigation strategies from a national and international perspective
include increasing resiliency to supply disruptions and developing leading indicators of such
disruptions. Ways to build resiliency primarily relate to the production and processing of raw
materials. This could mean improving extraction methods to make the production of critical raw
materials more cost efficient, less damaging to the environment, and less prone to labor
exploitation; increasing end-of-life material recovery efforts; manipulating trade policy and
international relations to minimize the negative impacts of controlling producers such as China;
and diversifying production whenever possible to offset supply vulnerability caused by
producers with a supply monopoly. Additional strategies include the development of substitute
materials and dematerialization. The development of leading indicators is more complex
because drivers of supply threats include things like geopolitical conflict, political corruption,
physical scarcity, and natural disasters which are difficult to quantify and prone to uncertainty.
The critical material frameworks developed by entities like the U.S. Department of Energy
and the EU reflect the complex web of factors that contribute to criticality. They generally
include indicators that span three categories, social, environmental, and economic. For example,
country concentration, by-product dependency, production costs in extraction, risk of strategic
use, market balance, and climate change vulnerability. To quantify these indicators requires data
that is not easily accessible, as well as high-level expertise to analyze that data, which
furthermore must be aggregated into an indexed score. For example, to determine the supply
risk of a given critical material could involve information about geological availability (i.e.,
where in the world does the material naturally occur), technical availability (i.e., can the material
be economically extracted), and environmental and/or social barriers to mining the material (e.g.,
water contamination, labor disputes, armed conflict). Risk may also need to be assessed
temporally (e.g., short term vs. medium term), further complicating an already time and resource
intensive process.
Unlike the national and international bodies that have developed systematic frameworks for
assessing criticality, most firms lack an integrated and recurring way to track and measure
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critical material supply disruptions in a way that is adaptable to their specific business operations
and strategies. Firms have access to published findings such as the U.S. Department of Energy’s
Critical Materials Strategy (2011) but have little control or leverage on the external factors
emphasized in many current criticality assessment methodologies. Whereas governments can
influence trade policies, regulations, and other macro level factors that impact both demand and
supply of critical materials, firms rarely have influence outside of the primary tiers of their
supply chains. An individual firm can’t access government stockpiles of critical materials, levy
tariffs, or resolve political conflicts that inhibit production of critical materials. And yet, firms
do influence demand for critical materials through the technologies and products that they
choose to develop and bring to market. There is a disconnect between the demand created by
firms and the critical material supply.
1.2.

Research Objectives
This work aims to address the following research questions:
What is the specific impact of criticality to firms?
How can firms create a criticality risk assessment framework that can be used
efficiently and effectively for their specific business operations and strategies?
In terms of broader impact, this research is intended to develop a concept (i.e., a framework),

for firm-level criticality assessment and mitigation based on insight gained from a review of the
literature, an analysis of current assessment practices at the firm-level, and analysis of two
industry-specific criticality scenarios (aviation and controlled environment agriculture).

2.

Chapter 2 – Methodology

2.1.

Methods
Criticality assessment is a complex undertaking with internal and external variables as well

as macro and micro level variables. There are also several levels of analysis (e.g. global,
national, industry, material, country of origin), and many different analysis methodologies such
as traditional risk assessment, supply chain management, and sustainability practice. Given this,
a multi-factor approach was used to examine critical material supply risk from a firm
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perspective. First, literature review was conducted in an effort to understand how criticality is
currently being assessed. Second, an exploratory case study of the use of rhenium in the aviation
industry was used to evaluate the impact of critical material price volatility on firm performance.
Third, eleven existing firm-level studies (Rosenau-Tornow, Buchholz et al. 2009, Duclos, Otto et
al. 2010, Lloyd, Clifton et al. 2012, Lloyd, Lee et al. 2012, Nieto, Guelly et al. 2013, Bensch,
Kolotzek et al. 2015, Gardner and Colwill 2016, Lapko, Trucco et al. 2016, Hallstedt and
Isaksson 2017, Kolotzek, Helbig et al. 2018)—a subset of the 42 studies initially reviewed and
noted in section 1.2—were analyzed to identify data and indicators for criticality assessment.
Fourth, a firm-level risk analysis was conducted to determine internal indicators relevant to firmlevel supply disruption mitigation. Finally, a framework for firm-level criticality assessment was
developed by combining the above analysis, firm organizational structures, and the role of
inventory and demand management as characterized by an established economic phenomenon,
the bullwhip effect.
Literature Review

2.2.

There is a large body of literature that defines criticality, identifies specific materials as
critical, and establishes clear indicators of criticality. The literature also examines the formal
methodologies that have been developed by nations and governments for the purpose of
assessing and mitigating criticality (Graedel and Reck 2016). The U.S. Department of Energy,
the U.S. Department of Defense, the European Union, and Germany are just some examples.
There are also initiatives between government and industry that exist for the purpose of
addressing critical material supply risk (e.g., the U.S. Critical Materials Institute, the European
Institute of Innovation and Technology Raw Materials in the EU, the National Institute of
Materials Science in Japan). Each of these entities is concerned with things like the quantities of
critical raw materials consumed, extracted, imported, and exported in their respective
geographical areas and globally; trade dependencies and other vulnerabilities stemming from the
high production concentration of some critical materials in places like China; the particular uses
of critical materials; future demand for critical raw materials; and future uses of critical raw
materials.
A review of 42 of the most relevant criticality studies to-date was conducted in an effort to
understand how criticality is currently being assessed. These studies include peer-reviewed
11

journal articles, research project reports, and policy reports. We conducted our search using
Google Scholar, ScienceDirect, Wiley Online Library, and Web of Science. Keywords queried
include critical material supply risk, critical material framework, criticality assessment, criticality
framework, raw materials criticality, and raw material assessment. The overall set of literature
identified included topics such as material recovery and recycling, demand forecasting, supply
chain resilience, supply chain management, crisis readiness, and criticality assessment
methodologies. We focused on studies that specifically addressed criticality assessment and that
did so using a defined scope, explicit risk indicators, and a model, framework, or framework.
For broad studies that didn’t address firm-level criticality assessment we relied on the more
highly cited works. We did not use any criteria for firm-level studies. Our goal was to identify
all literature that incorporated a firm-level scope.
The metrics used in each study can be organized into six broad categories as follows, with
significant overlap among these categories.
•

Scarcity risk concerns the physical availability of critical materials. Indicators may
include crustal abundance, reserves, mine production, static depletion times, stockpiles,
substitutability, and recycling.

•

Geopolitical risk quantifies risk stemming from political and governance activity across
the globe that may restrict or limit material availability. Geopolitical dynamics impact the
export, pricing, and regulations of materials supplied. The most commonly used
indicator is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) which can show the presence of
monopolies. The World Governance Indicators (WGI) are the primary geopolitical
stability indicators used to weight the HHI. This category also includes regulatory and
compliance indicators. As shown in section 5.1 in Appendix A, cobalt is an instructive
example of how geopolitical risk can impact criticality.

•

Demand risk is a key determinant of material availability that considers the volatility of
demand relative to a supplier’s ability to scale up or down. It is most often assessed
using demand projections derived from sources like consultancy and market analyst
reports, expert opinion, and assumed annual growth rates relative to economic growth.

•

Environmental risk considers environmental damage that may occur as a result of raw
material extraction and processing. The primary tool used for this assessment is the
Environmental Performance Index (EPI). Life cycle assessment (LCA), and the
12

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
are also used to assess environmental risk.
•

Supply chain risk refers to factors that can influence material procurement due to
suppliers, manufacturers, and distributors of critical materials. Examples include the
number of suppliers of a given material as well as the physical concentration of a material
in a particular geographic area (e.g. a country).

•

Market risk is a determinant of the market viability of products that rely on critical
materials. The primary factor of market risk in this context is material price. Indicators
include price volatility, price spikes, cost competition, and ability to pass on increased
costs to consumers. One example of market risk is a price spike due to rapid market
adoption of products containing critical materials such as electric vehicles or solar panels.
Another example is competing demand for critical materials due to emerging
technologies in different industries and/or novel applications of critical materials.

Although the actual materials assessed and the specific metrics used vary from one study to
the next, each study aims to assess criticality in terms of vulnerability to supply disruptions. The
studies reviewed represent criticality metrics in addition to those proposed by the U.S. National
Research Council (NRC) in 2008. The NRC was among the first research groups to suggest
metrics that consisted of two key dimensions of criticality: supply risk and impact of supply
disruption. All of the evaluated studies are listed in Table 6.1. in Appendix A.
The major point of distinction among the studies reviewed is the scope of each criticality
assessment, which varies from global, to European, to national, to firm level. Of the 42 studies,
10 assess criticality at the global level exclusively (Buchert, Schüler et al. 2009, RosenauTornow, Buchholz et al. 2009, Bauer, Diamond et al. 2010, Bauer, Diamond et al. 2011, Brown,
Bide et al. 2011, Achzet and Helbig 2013, Helbig, Kolotzek et al. 2017, Sustainability, Survey et
al. 2017, Brown 2018, Jasiński, Cinelli et al. 2018), 4 focus exclusively on Europe (EC 2010, EC
2014, Deloitte Sustainability et al. 2017, Blengini et al. 2017), 9 focus exclusively at the national
level (Council 2008, Morley and Eatherley 2008, Angerer, Marscheider-Weidemann et al. 2009,
AEA Technology 2010, AEA Technology 2011, Hatayama and Tahara 2015, Glöser-Chahoud,
Tercero Espinoza et al. 2016, Bach, Finogenova et al. 2017, Daw 2017), and 11 focus
exclusively on the corporate or firm level (Duclos, Otto et al. 2010, Lloyd, Clifton et al. 2012,
Lloyd, Lee et al. 2012, Nieto, Guelly et al. 2013, Bensch, Kolotzek et al. 2015, Gardner and
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Colwill 2016, Lapko, Trucco et al. 2016, Miehe, Schneider et al. 2016, Hallstedt and Isaksson
2017, Gardner and Colwill 2018, Kolotzek, Helbig et al. 2018). An additional 7 studies address
the global, national, and firm levels (Graedel, Barr et al. 2012, Graedel, Gunn et al. 2014,
Graedel, Harper et al. 2015, Graedel, Harper et al. 2015, Nassar, Graedel et al. 2015, Helbig,
Wietschel et al. 2016, Knobloch, Zimmermann et al. 2018). The final study in the group of 42
focuses on the global and national level (Nassar, Graedel et al. 2015). There is a useful diversity
of approaches within each scope as well. The British Geological Survey provides a supply risk
assessment index that considers factors that effect material availability for 42 elements at the
global level (Brown, Bide et al. 2011). Conversely, the Öko Institute provides assessment
methodology for just a select few materials required for renewable and energy efficient
technologies at the global level (Buchert, Schüler et al. 2009). The parameters of the studies
conducted on a national level differ by country. Developed nations such as the U.S., the U.K.,
and Germany each focus on criticality assessment methods that affect their respective economies
specifically.
As evidenced by the literature discussion above and in Appendix A, the majority of the
existing work on criticality assessment focuses on risk quantification derived from primarily
external factors (e.g. geological and economic availability, policy and regulation, geopolitical
risk, environmental, etc.). While fundamentally relevant to criticality, external factors can’t be
directly controlled by individual firms. For example, some of the most frequently used
indicators concern supply from a geopolitical perspective. These include the Policy Potential
Index, the Human Development Index, the World Governance Indicators, and the Fund for
Peace’s Failed State Index. Intended to capture risk in the countries that supply critical materials
(due to things like taxation and regulation, vulnerability to political conflict or collapse, standard
of living, government corruption, and likelihood of violence), these indicators are even further
outside the sphere of influence of an individual firm. Nevertheless, ten out of eleven firm-level
studies incorporated one or more indicators in the geopolitical category (Rosenau-Tornow,
Buchholz et al. 2009, Duclos, Otto et al. 2010, Lloyd, Clifton et al. 2012, Lloyd, Lee et al. 2012,
Nieto, Guelly et al. 2013, Bensch, Kolotzek et al. 2015, Lapko, Trucco et al. 2016, Miehe,
Schneider et al. 2016, Hallstedt and Isaksson 2017, Kolotzek, Helbig et al. 2018).
While a majority of the studies incorporated demand indicators, only four of the eleven
studies that consider the firm-level perspective incorporated such indicators in their assessment
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methodologies (Duclos, Otto et al. 2010, Bensch, Kolotzek et al. 2015, Lapko, Trucco et al.
2016, Kolotzek, Helbig et al. 2018). Demand is relevant to any business and as such, most firms
use forecasting tools to predict future product sales for themselves and competitors within their
industry. However, forecasting for other industries that might compete for the same materials is
often outside of a firm’s scope.
Although many studies did include some criticality indicators that are environmental in
scope, these were primarily regulatory in nature. From a business perspective, the implication
here is that environmental indicators of criticality, such as material recovery potential,
recyclability, and R&D funding committed to the development of substitute materials, aren’t
relevant to firms. Also absent from studies reviewed in this work are metrics related to lost
profit correlated to environmental harm caused by a firm’s use of critical materials, or lost profit
due to negative media exposure related to that environmental harm. Furthermore, no studies
could be found that consider specific environmental impacts such as air, land, and water
pollution, carbon emissions, or hazardous waste, as they specifically relate to obtaining and using
critical materials at the firm level. In their work on material supply chain resilience, Sprecher et
al. report that environmental considerations were omitted from their framework altogether
because their interviewees indicated little to no concern for them (Sprecher, Daigo et al. 2015).
A total of 13 regulatory and compliance indicators were found in the environmental, geopolitical,
and supply chain categories; all of them were external and none of them directly considered
environmental impact caused by firms or any downstream effect to firm profit. These indicators
are listed in Table 6.2 in Appendix B.
2.3.

Exploratory Case Study
The case study approach used in this paper was chosen because the research conducted here

is preliminary and primarily conceptual. Very little work has been done on firm-level criticality
assessment to date, and this approach allows criticality assessment to be explored from the
perspective and scope of a firm rather than that of geography, politics, or the environment, all of
which are extremely broad and have been studied extensively. Through the use of two firm-level
case studies we can begin to establish parameters around firm-level criticality risk.
The first case looks at the aviation industry’s use of one material (rhenium), used in one
application (jet turbine blades), in one industry. This case specifically examines the price
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volatility of rhenium and its impact on the cost of production of jet engines. Price volatility is the
chosen metric because it is easily measurable and material costs have significant impacts on the
financial well-being of firms.
To conduct the aviation case study, the following steps were taken. First, historical pricing,
supply (in terms of world reserves and production), consumption, and material applications for
rhenium were established using data from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) (John 2015,
Polyak 2018). Second, the material cost of the amount of rhenium required to manufacture one
jet engine was estimated using data from Rolls-Royce plc (a leading manufacturing of jet
engines), and pricing date from the USGS. Third, the pricing data was plotted over time in real
dollars and in 2017 (inflation adjusted) dollars. Fourth, the material fraction of total material
cost for one jet engine was calculated. This was done using the dry engine weight of one jet
engine and the average amount of rhenium needed for one jet engine. Given the material
fraction, material cost was determined using the price of rhenium in a given year, and the list
price per jet engine. This metric was calculated based on 2008 and 2017 rhenium prices. The
year 2008 was chosen because the rhenium market experienced a price spike at that time. The
year 2017 was chosen because it was the most recent year for which the USGS published
rhenium pricing data. Finally, the rhenium fraction of total cost (%) and the price of rhenium per
kg ($USD) were plotted against the year-over-year change in gross margin which was obtained
from corporate annual reports. The specific calculations were made using the following
parameters and assumptions: the jet engine used in this analysis is the Trent XWB manufactured
by Rolls-Royce plc.; the average amount of rhenium needed to manufacture engines for one
aircraft is 50kg; the list price per engine in 2017 was $35M USD; and gross margin data is based
on revenue from the aviation sector only, as listed in Rolls-Royce plc annual reports.
The second case looks at the lighting industry’s use of six critical materials (cerium,
europium, gadolinium, gallium, indium, and yttrium), that are used to manufacture horticultural
LED lighting. This case examines market demand rather than price volatility in order to
highlight a second aspect of criticality that our work found to be prevalent. Specifically, market
demand has material impacts on supply pressures commonly associated with criticality and, in
the case of horticultural LEDs, market demand is generated by multiple market sectors such as
electronics, healthcare, and general lighting. This means that the supply of critical materials
needed for strategically important technologies (e.g., sustainable technologies), could be diverted
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to economically important applications (e.g., consumer electronics), regardless of the
sustainability implications.
The methodological approach to the controlled environment agriculture case study has two
components: the critical materials used in horticultural lighting, and the amount of light needed
given certain food production requirements. In terms of critical materials, the first step was to
establish the critical material composition (i.e., the type and quantity of materials), of LED grow
lamps. Second, the critical material intensity (i.e., the type and quantity of materials needed to
produce one unit of something), was determined. In this case, sole source lighting, as applied in
controlled environment agriculture, is the thing being produced. One unit is defined as the
number of grow lamps needed to produce an amount of food needed by a given population over
a given period of time. Finally, the costs of the types and quantities of critical materials required
by LED grow lamps were calculated and analyzed in terms of one unit of production.
Critical material composition was based on data in a 2017 report published by the Nordic
Council of Ministers (Punkkinen et al 2017). The authors compiled multiple data sources and
presented their findings in terms of estimated average weight per bulb. In order to account for
differences across manufacturers, the authors assume an average weight of 0.185 kg per unit.
Because the critical material composition data identified in the literature was given in composite
form rather than by specific grow lamp product, we identified a typical light fixture—a high bay
LED horticultural lamp manufactured by CREE—to serve as a proxy. The critical material
composition per high bay LED fixture is listed in Table 7.1.1. in Appendix C.
The amount of light needed was defined in terms of number of fixture hours. The number of
fixtures is a factor of the amount and quality of light emitted by a given grow lamp. The number
of hours is a factor of the amount and quality of light required by a given crop. The total amount
of light needed for a given level of food production was determined based on dietary needs, crop
yields, required food production by mass, growing space, and plant light requirements.
In order to define a certain level of food production, a number of assumptions were made.
First, a sample diet consisting of fruits and vegetables only was defined based on the United
States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) “Healthy U.S.-Style Eating Pattern”
recommendations for moderately active adults (2015). This information is shown in Table 7.1.2.
in Appendix C. The sample diet consists of a total of 13 crops (peppers, broccoli, cantaloupe,
eggplant, green beans, kale, onions, potatoes, spinach, strawberries, summer squash, and
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tomatoes), across the five categories of vegetables (i.e., dark green, red and orange, legumes,
starchy, and other), and one category of fruit as specified in the USDA dietary guidelines (2015).
Next, based on the USDA intake recommendations (by volume), and crop yields per crop, the
amount of physical growing space needed to produce enough food for one person for one year
was calculated (2015). This information is presented in Table 7.1.3. in Appendix C. Having
established the square footage requiring artificial lighting, the number of grow lamps required to
grow sufficient food was determined based on the amount and duration of light required by each
crop relative to the amount of light provided by one grow lamp. An explanation of how to
determine the amount of light required by crop, is included in Appendix C. Next, the total
number of grow lamps needed to grow enough fruits and vegetables for one person for one year
using sole source lighting in a controlled environment agriculture setting was calculated.
Finally, critical material intensity was calculated based on the critical material composition
of one LED bulb, the population being fed, dietary requirements, growing space, and lighting
requirements. To feed one person for one year under the scenario modeled in this work would
require 12 high bay LED bulbs. To feed the projected world population in 2050 would require
approximately 113.2 billion high bay LED bulbs. A schematic representing the methodology for
determining critical material intensity is presented in Figure 7.2.1. in Appendix C.
2.4.

Analysis of Existing Firm-Level Frameworks
The 11 existing firm-level studies identified in section 2.2. contain a total of 96 indicators of

criticality studies (Rosenau-Tornow, Buchholz et al. 2009, Duclos, Otto et al. 2010, Lloyd,
Clifton et al. 2012, Lloyd, Lee et al. 2012, Nieto, Guelly et al. 2013, Bensch, Kolotzek et al.
2015, Gardner and Colwill 2016, Lapko, Trucco et al. 2016, Hallstedt and Isaksson 2017,
Kolotzek, Helbig et al. 2018). Analysis of these indicators included sorting them into the six
broad categories of risk outlined in section 2.2. (scarcity, geopolitical, demand, environmental,
supply chain, and market risk), and then breaking them down further into sub-categories based
on the specific aim of each indicator. For example, within the category of scarcity, six subcategories were identified: physical/geological abundance (e.g. abundance of a given material in
the earth’s crust); production capacity (e.g. utilization of mine/refinery capacity); recycling (e.g.
recyclability of a given material); stock/reserves (e.g. known stockpiles); substitutability (e.g.
firm’s ability to substitute one material for another due to supply disruption); and supply (e.g.
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percent of world supply used). Next, each indicator was identified as having an internal or
external scope. Out of the 96 indicators identified, 79 were classified as external and 17 were
classified as internal. Examples of indicators classified as internal in scope include impact on
revenue, non-forecasted upside demand, delivery capability, and potential cost increase.
Examples of indicators in the external scope include future market capacity, concentration risk,
co-production risk, and environmental regulation. A table of the indicators reflecting this
analysis and identifying the study from which each indicator was found can be found in
Appendix A in the supplemental material (Griffin et al 2019).
2.5.

Internal Indicators for Firm-Level Risk Assessment and Mitigation
Informed by the analysis of existing firm-level frameworks, a novel set of internal indicators

intended to support the assessment of supply risk at the firm level was developed (Griffin et al
2019). Criteria used to select indicators included the availability of data needed for criticality
assessment; the frequency with which that data is generated; the accessibility of the data in the
regular course of business (i.e. whether or not the data is already being collected, analyzed,
reported, etc.); the potential for a firm to influence the data being collected through its business
strategies and objectives; the extent to which the indicators as a whole address the basic
functions of any typical business; and the alignment of the indicators with existing key
performance metrics such as revenue, profit, stock price, etc.
2.6.

Developing a Novel Framework
The framework for firm-level criticality assessment was designed with the goal of being

relevant to most any business that produces and/or sells manufactured goods, and to incorporate
all major operational aspects of such firms. To accomplish this, three categories of risk to
manufacturing-related firms were defined: profitability, design and concept viability, and
production. The first category is intended to capture threats to the fundamental integrity (i.e. a
product’s ability to meet performance requirements if an originally specified critical material
experiences a supply disruption), and market potential of products that rely on a given critical
material. The second category is intended to capture threats to the manufacturing and
distribution of products that rely on a given critical material. The third category is intended to
capture threats to the financial sustainability of firms that produce products that rely on a given
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critical material. The selection of indicators for each risk category was driven by four core
business functions that incorporate all activities needed to produce and/or sell manufactured
product—finance, procurement, marketing, and production—as well as their potential to
generate actionable data (Griffin et al 2019).
Unlike the global and national level indicators emphasized in most current research, these
indicators must be derived from primary (and often proprietary), data. In addition, because the
aim of this research is to provide an accessible resource for many different kinds of firms, this
data must generally be available in the normal course of business such that firms can compile it
with reasonable ease. The ultimate goal of the proposed internal indicators is to facilitate a
holistic and multifaceted analysis of critical material supply disruption risk at the firm level
(Griffin et al 2019).
2.7.

Data
The data used in this research can be understood in three categories: academic, corporate, and

government. A search of the academic literature provided data about current approaches and
practices related to criticality assessment and mitigation. Examples include assessment
frameworks, criticality rating systems, and lists of materials determined by the scientific
community to be critical. Commonly cited journals include Resources Policy, Environmental
Science & Technology, and Resources, Conservation, and Recycling. The academic literature
also provided material composition data used to calculate estimated material requirements.
Corporate documents included annual financial reports which provided insight to a firm’s
awareness of criticality risk. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) mandated filings provided
historical financial information used to analyze trends in revenue and profit. Additional corporate
data included product specifications published in marketing materials.
Government data came from multiple sources including the British Geological Survey, the
European Union Commission, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of
Energy, and the U.S. Geological Survey. This data included information about the physical,
economic, and strategic characteristics of critical materials.
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Chapter 3 - Results
Current literature suggests that the impact of critical materials at the firm level is evident in
supply disruptions, short-term profitability, and long-term financial sustainability.
To assess this assertion, two case studies were conducted. The first examines the impact of
rhenium price volatility on the aviation industry. The second examines the impact of rare earth
elements, gallium, and yttrium price volatility on controlled environment agriculture. Price
volatility was selected as the impact factor because material cost is highly relevant for
manufacturing firms and because firms have direct access to purchasing and pricing data for at
least the first tier of their supply chains. Firms also have some ability to influence the prices they
pay through procurement and inventory strategies like hedging. The aviation industry was
selected because it is the largest consumer of rhenium. Controlled environment agriculture was
selected because an increasing percentage of the world’s food supply will need to be grown
indoors due to the negative impacts of climate change on conventional agriculture; in order to do
so, a substantial amount of horticultural lighting reliant upon critical materials will be required
(Griffin et al 2019).
Price volatility is a measure of the changes in the price of commodities over a short period of
time, and can result in many negative impacts to firms. For example, an increase in the cost of
goods sold (e.g. price of materials), a decrease in raw material and finished product supply (e.g.
inventory on hand), a decrease in production efficiency (e.g. idle machine time), and a decrease
in revenue due to lost sales. Other problems include uncertainty in costs, product pricing,
earnings, and credit availability, thus affecting the short-term profitability and long-term survival
of firms (Agarwal, Ofori et al. 2012). Specifically, price volatility negatively impacts margin,
working capital, and share prices, with earnings shown to rise and fall as much as 10% to 30%
(Agarwal, Ofori et al. 2012).
Each of these financial metrics can provide valuable insight to a firm’s health and financial
sustainability. A firm’s margin represents the amount of money that it earns per sales dollar and
is correlated to profit. When margins decrease, profit may decrease as well. At the product
level, this may cause a firm to stop manufacturing a particular technology such as the more fuelefficient turbine blades used in GE’s jet engines or the more efficient and effective LED grow
lights used in controlled environment agriculture. A firm’s working capital represents the
amount of cash and other short-term assets (e.g. accounts receivable), that it has available to pay
21

for operating expenses at any point in time. Low working capital increases a firm’s financial
risk. If a manufacturing firm is faced with a price spike for a material that it relies on, the firm’s
ability to service its short-term debt may be compromised. If the impact persists, a decline in
working capital could threaten the viability of a firm overall. A firm’s share price is the amount
of money that a person is willing to pay for the firm’s stock. Changes in share price impact a
firm’s ability to raise capital and are an indicator of the financial health of the organization. A
decrease in share price may cause a firm to cut costs in order to increase margins. A firm might
cut costs by abandoning certain products or through more invasive measures such as cutting
funding for research and development.
3.1.

Aviation Case Study
The predominant driver of the price of rhenium is demand created by the aviation industry

which relies on this material to achieve high-temperature properties in blades and vanes for high
pressure aero and industrial gas turbine engines. These turbines are in high demand because
their ability to withstand extremely high temperatures enables increased performance and fuel
efficiency in jet engines.
Rhenium is an expensive metal with historical price volatility that is used in the manufacture
of superalloys, catalysts, and gas-to-liquid (GTL) refinery processes (Polyak 2017). It is a byproduct of copper ores with little to no direct mining, and approximately 80% of demand is met
through primary production (MSP-REFRAM 2017). Secondary rhenium provides the remaining
supply and is produced mostly through foundry and mill scrap recycling, and recycling of parts
from jet engines that have reached end of life (Duclos, Otto et al. 2010). Estimated world
reserves of rhenium are 11 kt of which 5 kt are found in the U.S. (John 2015). Despite the
considerable reserves of rhenium located in the U.S., a lack of production facilities drastically
limits what can be supplied domestically (John 2015). For example, in 2017, world production
of rhenium was 52,000 kg. Of the 42,600 kg consumed by the U.S. in the same year, 8,500 kg
was mined in the U.S. which has a total of six mining operations: four in Arizona, one in
Montana, and one in Utah (Polyak 2018).
Most of the remaining 34,100 kg of rhenium consumed in the U.S. in 2017 was imported
from Canada, Chile, Germany, Kazakhstan, and the Republic of Korea (Polyak 2018).
Additional sources included Estonia, France, Japan, Poland, and Russia (Polyak 2018). Although
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the United States currently has positive diplomatic relations with the majority of these countries,
political conditions and trade policy are subject to change at any time. Particularly in the context
of sustainable technologies, should demand for materials like rhenium dramatically increase,
tariffs could make imports unfeasible. Foreign countries may also elect to stop exporting certain
materials altogether. China’s trade policies are of particular concern. In 2017 China produced
80% of the supply and accounted for more than 66% of global demand for rare earth elements,
many of which are considered critical (GlobalData Energy 2018). Mancheri et al argue that
China’s influence on the resilience of the rare earth element supply chain is strong enough that
trade policies affect China differently than they do the rest of the world (2019).
The cost of rhenium is based on prices issued by the London-based Minor Metals Trade
Association and long-term purchasing agreements between the consumer and producer (Lipmann
2005). Because rhenium operates in an opaque market—most transactions are made through
long-term contracts that aren’t publicly recorded—it is susceptible to drastic and sudden price
changes that are generally triggered by market speculation (Lipmann 2005, Polyak 2017). For
example, in 2008, strong demand triggered by speculation and sudden large orders for new
generation aircraft—built with blade turbines requiring rhenium—led to a price spike in which
the cost of rhenium reached $12,500/kg compared to a more typical cost in the range of
$1,800/kg to $2,600/kg. By the middle of 2009, the market corrected to a cost of $4,000/kg to
$4,500/kg (EC 2014). This is illustrated in Figure 3.1.1.
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Figure 3.1.1. Price Volatility of Rhenium, 1975 – 2017 (Polyak 2017, Polyak 2018)
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Although rhenium can be recycled from decommissioned gas turbines and catalytic
converters, this secondary source does not necessarily relieve price pressure in the broader
market because recycled rhenium has lower purity than rhenium derived directly from ore and
therefore produces different technological results. General Electric (GE), for example, initially
touted the use of recycled rhenium as a demand (and therefore cost), reduction strategy in the
wake of the 2008 price spike (Duclos, Otto et al. 2010). Although possible from an engineering
standpoint, the reduction and/or elimination of the use of rhenium in these engines was
ultimately unviable because it resulted in decreased fuel efficiency (Duclos 2016). GE is
currently pursuing and finding success with the development and implementation of ceramic
framework composites (Kellner 2017).
The economic and strategic importance of rhenium in the aviation industry is evident in the
cost of production. The average amount of rhenium needed to manufacture engines for one
commercial aircraft, such as Rolls-Royce’s Trent XWB, is 50kg (MSP-REFRAM). The cost for
this amount of rhenium at the all-time high 2008 price of $10,400 USD/kg would be $520,000
USD per aircraft vs. $76,500 USD per aircraft at the 2017 price of $1,530 USD/kg, a decrease of
85.29%. Based on the 2017 list price of about $35M USD per engine, a gross margin of 14.9%,
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and the 2017 price of rhenium, the Trent XWB earns $5,215,000 USD per engine on a revenue
and cost basis (plc 2018). By comparison, the Trent XWB earns just $1,753,500 USD per engine
at 2008 rhenium prices. This is equal to a loss of -9.89% in gross margin, or $3,461,500 USD
per engine. Material fraction of total material cost, which provides an indication of the
importance of a given material with regard to product functionality and value, also demonstrates
the criticality of rhenium in aviation. In this case, the amount of rhenium needed to produce one
Trent XWB engine accounts for just 0.69% of the total dry engine weight of 7,277 kg (Agency
2013). At 2008 rhenium prices, the material fraction cost is equal to 1.99% versus 0.26% at
2017 prices. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1.2.
Despite the suggested role of speculation in the 2008 rhenium price spike, it is important to
note that the broader macroeconomic climate was also extremely volatile at this time. The
financial crisis of 2007-2008 resulted in a steep global recession in 2009 so, although the
rhenium market did experience a market correction in 2009, real correlative relationships cannot
be asserted between the cost of critical materials and firm profit based on this data alone. The
circumstances surrounding a similar price spike that occurred in 1980 mimic those of the 2008
price spike. The single-crystal nickel-based superalloys that rely on rhenium for their high creep
strength were emerging in the early 1980s when U.S. economy also experienced a significant
recession (Mottura and Reed 2014).
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Figure 3.1.2. Unit Cost of Rhenium per Trent XWB Engine vs. 2017 Gross Margin of RollsRoyce
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Although this case study focuses on the example of one aircraft manufacturer, Rolls-Royce
plc is not the only aerospace firm that relies on materials vulnerable to price spikes. To further
understand the dynamic between critical material price volatility and firm performance, annual
and quarterly data was analyzed for three additional aircraft manufacturing firms that rely
heavily on rhenium: Boeing, General Electric (GE), and Pratt & Whitney (a subsidiary of United
Technologies). This information is available in Appendix D.
3.2.

Controlled Environment Agriculture
Controlled environment agriculture (CEA) is a form of urban agriculture that relies

exclusively on artificial lighting (i.e., sole source lighting), for plant production. The reason
CEA firms should care about critical materials is that the three primary types of horticultural
lighting technologies—high intensity discharge (HID), linear fluorescent (LFL), and light
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emitting diode (LED)—all rely on critical materials. Critical materials are minerals and metals
that are vulnerable to supply disruptions and high in economic or strategic importance. In the
case of CEA, critical materials are important because they impact some of the specific
characteristics of artificial lighting technologies that make crops successful or not.
This case focuses on LED lighting because, although these horticultural grow lamps are the
most expensive, they are also the most energy efficient and have the longest lifespan. To
manufacture LED grow lights requires critical materials such as cerium, europium, gadolinium,
gallium, indium, and yttrium. These materials determine the spectrum (i.e., color), of light
emitted by any given light bulb (Buchert et al 2012). Because plants require light from specific
wavelengths on the light spectrum (Runkle 2015), the utility of any artificial lighting used in
plant production is dependent on the material composition of the light bulbs being used. For
example, yttrium, gadolinium, and cerium are commonly used to produce yellow hued light
versus europium which is integral for producing red light (Buchert et al 2010). This is
particularly relevant to LED lighting because this technology can be customized to emit the
spectrum of light required at different plant growth stages and by different crop types in order to
optimize yield.
There are six critical materials included in the controlled environment agriculture case.
These include gallium, indium, and four rare earth elements (cerium, europium, gadolinium, and
yttrium).
•

Gallium is a metal used primarily for semiconductors, LEDs, and PV components.
Primary deposits of gallium are found in Australia, China, Brazil, and India. Annual
production capacity is 180 metric tons per year versus a recycling capacity of 200 metric
tons per year worldwide (Jaskula 2019). However, the stated recycling capacity includes
material that is not economically viable to recover (Jaskula 2019). United States
consumption of gallium was equal to an estimated 23 metric tons in 2018 (Jaskula 2019).

•

Indium is a metal used in the production of infrared detectors, high-speed transistors, PV
cells, and LEDs. Most often derived as a byproduct of zinc ores, primary sources of
indium can be found in China, Peru, Canada, Australia, and the United States. In 2010,
primary global indium production was 570 metric tons (Anderson 2019). United States
consumption of indium was an estimated 170 metric tons in 2018 (Anderson 2019).
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•

Rare Earth Elements are a group of 17 elements that share similar properties, and are
comprised of the 15 lanthanides, scandium, and yttrium (Gambogi 2019a, Gambogi
2019b). They are produced almost exclusively by China where 97% of rare earth mining
and concentration occurs (Gambogi 2019a, Gambogi 2019b). Of particular note is the
fact that 80% of the world’s supply of phosphors used for lighting technologies is
consumed by China (Gambogi 2019a, Gambogi 2019b). The following four rare earth
elements are commonly used in LED lighting (Gambogi 2019a, Gambogi 2019b).
o Cerium is a metal used for a wide variety of applications including nuclear
technologies, pigments, ceramics, metallurgical alloys, catalysts, glass and
polishing, and phosphors such as those used in LED lighting.
o Europium is a metal used in the production of nuclear technologies, defense
technologies, ceramics, and phosphors such as those used in LED lighting.
o Gadolinium is a metal used in nuclear technologies, ceramics, glass and polishing,
and phosphors such as those used in LED lighting.
o Yttrium is a metal used in the production of nuclear technologies, defense
technologies, ceramics, metallurgical alloys, and phosphors such as those used in
LED lighting.
Production and consumption of rare earth elements is reported in aggregate with the
exception of yttrium. In 2017, China reported production of 180,000 metric tons of rareearth-oxide equivalent (Gambogi 2019a). Although the United States did not produce
any rare earth elements in 2017, it did produce 15,000 metric tons in 2018 (Gambogi
2019a). The only other country with mine production above 2,600 metric tons per year is
Australia which produced 19,000 metric tons in 2017 and 20,000 metric tons in 2018
(Gambogi 2019a). United States consumption of rare earth elements was estimated at
9,500 metric tons in 2018 (Gambogi 2019a). In addition to the other 16 rare earth
elements, China is also the dominant producer of yttrium (Gambogi 2019b). In 2018
China produced an estimated 5,000 to 7,000 metric tons of yttrium (Gambogi 2019b).
Domestic consumption of yttrium was estimated to be 400 metric tons in 2018 (Gambogi
2019b).

Supply dynamics similar to those discussed with regard to rhenium and the aviation industry
are relevant to the six critical materials being discussed in the context of horticultural LED
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lighting and controlled environment agriculture. This includes a reliance on effective diplomacy
between the United States and important producers like China. It also includes dependence on
the political conditions and trade policies of producing countries as well as the consumption
patterns of those same countries. In terms of cost and pricing, all six critical materials are traded
in an opaque market, as is the case for rhenium. In depth current and historical pricing data is
not publicly available but rather must be obtained directly from buyers and sellers, or from
information brokers such as the Shanghai Metals Market (SMM Information & Technology Co,
Ltd). The cost of rare earth elements in particular is largely controlled by China. In fact, rare
earth price spikes in 2010 and 2011 have been attributed to China’s decision to cut its export
allowances (GlobalData Energy 2018). Complicating the situation is the current trade war
between the United States and China through which tariffs are compromising trade relations
(GlobalData Energy 2018).
The economic and strategic importance of the critical materials (e.g., cerium, europium,
gadolinium, gallium, indium, and yttrium), used in horticultural LED lighting is evident in
market demand. Compared to rhenium, which has concentrated demand from the aviation
industry, the critical materials needed to manufacture horticultural lighting are also used for
numerous other technologies with strategic and/or economic importance. Some of these are
listed in Table 3.2.1. LED lighting designed for horticultural applications is especially
vulnerable to competing demand for the required critical materials. The reason for this is that
LEDs are low cost, high efficiency, have myriad uses, and are being rapidly adopted. For
example, the number of household installations of LED bulbs in 2014 was 195 times that of 2009
(DOE 2016). Between 2008 and 2016, the price of a typical household LED bulb dropped by
90% (Romm 2016).
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Table 3.2.1. Competing demand for critical materials used in LED horticultural lighting
technologies
Material
Cerium
Europium
Gadolinium
Gallium
Indium
Yttrium

Light
Strategic/Economic Importance
Technology
LFL, LED
Nuclear, pigments, ceramics, metallurgical alloys, catalysts,
glass and polishing, phosphors
LFL, LED
Nuclear, defense, ceramics, phosphors
LED
Nuclear, ceramics, phosphors, glass and polishing
LED
Semiconductors, LEDs, PV components
LED
Infrared detectors, high-speed transistors, PV cells
LFL, LED
Nuclear, defense, ceramics, metallurgical alloys, phosphors

LED horticultural lighting is in high demand due to the growth of indoor farming (Agrilyst et
al 2017). The expansion of controlled environment agriculture in particular is driven by
declining outdoor growing conditions related to climate change and increased urbanization.
Increased strain and pressure on water resources, an increase in the occurrence and extremity of
severe weather events, and increased temperature are just some of the ways that climate change
is making it more difficult to grow food using conventional, open field methods. Second, as
more and more people move to urban areas it will become less efficient to produce food in rural
areas far from population centers (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
2017). The transportation, distribution, and logistics involved will become more expensive and
generate more emissions. In other words, the strategic and economic importance of the critical
materials required to manufacture the lighting necessary for controlled environment agriculture
is simply the ability to produce enough food to feed the world population.
As in the aviation case, horticultural lighting manufacturers rely on materials vulnerable to
price spikes. Figure 3.2.1. shows the gross margin of a leading LED manufacturer, CREE,
before and since the price spike in rare earth elements that occurred around 2010. Rare earth
elements are used to manufacture horticultural lighting technologies and have very few or no
substitutes. Figure 3.2.2. shows CREE’s gross margin along with the price of Gallium, which is
a critical material that this manufacturer relies upon heavily.
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Figure 3.2.1 Annual Financial Performance of CREE vs. Price of Rare Earth Elements
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Figure 3.2.2. Annual Financial Performance of CREE vs. Price of Gallium
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In the aviation case, manufacturers are vulnerable to criticality fallout primarily due to the
extremely long process of manufacturing aircraft. Agreements about the number of aircraft to be
purchased at what price are contracted years ahead of actual production, and the fulfillment of
orders can occur over a period of years (Lipmann 2005, Polyak 2017). This makes it very
unlikely that increased costs due to price volatility and supply disruptions can be passed on to the
consumer. In the horticultural lighting case, manufacturers are similarly vulnerable but for
different reasons. Despite having the benefit of dramatically shorter production times, lighting
manufacturers face an extremely competitive market, the wide availability of many substitutes
(e.g., by technology or brand), and are forced to absorb any price spikes due to price competition
(CREE 2018).
Going back at least as far as the year 2000, CREE has commented on supply risk in its SEC
10-K filings. The company notes, in reference to sources of raw materials, that it depends on
“certain key materials and equipment used in critical stages of our manufacturing process” and
that its suppliers “can be subject to many constraints limiting supply that are beyond our control”
(CREE 2000-2018). The company also states that it is reliant on sole or limited source suppliers
and that, although alternate suppliers exist, the process of vetting them can take six months or
longer. Finally, CREE notes the difficulty and additional cost associated with obtaining certain
raw materials that are concentrated in conflict zones and therefore subject to transparency and
accountability regulations enforced by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (CREE 2012). As recently as 2017, CREE noted in its SEC 10-K that many of
the raw materials required to manufacture its products are prone to high price volatility as well as
variation in consistency and availability.
There are clear advantages and disadvantages to each of the three primary horticultural
lighting technologies that differently impact their vulnerability to critical material risk. For
example, the critical material requirement for fluorescent bulbs is considerably lower in mass
and cost compared to HID and LED bulbs (see Table 7.3.1. in Appendix C). However, supply
disruptions and price volatility have somewhat of an equalizing effect on the three technologies.
The cost and availability of critical materials becomes irrelevant when neither manufacturers nor
business consumers can absorb or compensate for the financial impact. For example, if HID,
fluorescent, and LED lighting were simultaneously unavailable and/or unaffordable,
manufacturers might resort to producing the comparatively inefficient and ineffective technology
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of incandescent bulbs to grow plants. However, even that technology relies on critical materials.
The filaments and lead wires are made of tungsten. Rolls-Royce can continue to produce jet
engines without rhenium; these engines won’t be as fuel efficient as the Trent XWB, but they
will effectively power aircraft. Horticultural lighting capable of emitting specific spectrums of
light, on the other hand, can’t be manufactured without critical materials like tungsten, cerium,
europium, gallium and yttrium.
The critical material risk to horticultural lighting manufacturing has multiple implications
beyond the firm. For example, assume that a significant percentage of agriculture has shifted to
controlled environment methods. If horticultural lighting manufacturing becomes limited,
unpredictable, or too costly, how does food get produced? Each type of light bulb—HID,
fluorescent, and LED—has a lifespan ranging between 6 and 14 years depending on the
technology and usage. This means that the impact of a critical material supply disruption would
lag significantly, assuming that currently deployed horticultural lighting varies in remaining
useful lifespan. However, there are additional factors at play. For example, using LED lighting
and indoor farming on a large scale may require more materials than are produced in a given
year. Another mitigating factor might be trade policy. The vast majority of the critical materials
used in horticultural lighting are produced in China. Although many of the critical materials used
in horticultural lighting can be reclaimed from light bulbs at end of life, it is not yet clear that this
strategy is efficient or economically feasible (Rhee et al 2013, Punkkinen et al 2017, Rahman et
al 2017). With limited and often no production capacity in the United States, a supply disruption
and/or price spike could theoretically last indefinitely.
3.3.

Firm Response: Supply Disruption Profile

It is unlikely that firms will be able to prevent critical material supply disruptions altogether
so their response to them when they occur is important. Figure 3.3.1. is an adaptation of a supply
chain disruption profile developed by Sheffi and Rice (2005). It depicts changes to firm
performance relative to a supply disruption and mitigation tactics over time, and includes several
of the mitigation strategies such as hedging, substitution, and development of new materials and
technologies. It may be surprising, but even firms that have long-term contracts in place for
commodities can still experience delays in delivery of that commodity due to disruptions. Nokia
had large losses due to a disruption in delivery of semiconductor devices that was caused by a
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supplier fire (a supplier that had long-term price contracts) (When the chain breaks 2006).
General Electric also had long-term contracts in place for rhenium; these agreements may not
always ensure commodity delivery when actual physical disruptions occur (Duclos 2016). Firms
are then forced to get the commodity, part, or product from a different supplier that they do not
have long-term contracts with and thus are forced to pay a much higher price.
Although the trajectory of the response shown assumes that the firm was engaged to some
extent in hedging, we can clearly see that once the benefits of hedging have been depleted (i.e.
short term inventory and alternate suppliers), the time to recovery and normalization is about
three times as long as the time between the disruption and the use of short term solutions. One
way that the profile is instructive on the goal of firm-level criticality assessment (i.e. to mitigate
and/or prevent a negative impact on firm performance due to supply disruption), is to apply the
scenario in Figure 3.1.2. For example, if Rolls-Royce had proactively identified substitutes or
developed new materials and technologies in place of rhenium, these mitigation tactics could
have been implemented directly following the assessment phase of the response, thereby
substantially reducing the drop in firm performance and its duration.
Figure 3.3.1. Conceptual Timeline of Firm Response to Supply Disruption

A number of additional insights and conclusions can also be drawn from the disruption
profile. First, firm performance relative to a supply disruption appears to be correlated to time.
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Second, the severity of the disruption’s impact varies throughout the profile suggesting that
interim firm actions are correlated to that firm’s progression through the profile. Third, the time
from the disruptive event to recovery, as well as the time between stages, is contingent on a
firm’s actions. In other words, although supply disruptions create predictable impacts across
organizations, an individual firm’s response determines the ultimate outcome. This means that
firm-level risk monitoring and mitigation is not only possible, but necessary.
Some of the ways that individual manufacturing firms can moderate the risk of critical
material supply disruption involve material usage, product development, product design, and
inventory management. For example, a firm might use one alloy in place of another, develop an
entirely new alloy, reduce waste through increased materialization, or decrease the amount of
material needed by increasing material efficiency. Another strategy might be cross-functional
collaboration during product development; at least some of the information needed to assess
criticality from the development stage is often located outside of R&D, so involving engineering
and procurement experts can make a determination of viability more efficient and prevent longterm risk. A third approach to risk mitigation is to design products that accommodate efficient
extraction of critical materials at end-of-life and create mechanisms to maximize end-of-life
material recovery. Inventory management strategies could include the use of long-term supply
contracts, hedging, and supplier transparency. Large firms might also use vertical integration to
acquire their suppliers or secure a primary source of material through mining rights and smelting
plants (Cullbrand and Magnusson 2012). Vertical integration is a supply chain strategy and
business model that firms use to gain more control over the inputs of production. Instead of
using third-party suppliers to secure materials, firms with an integrated supply chain own the
companies that provide the materials needed.
The success of these strategies depends on two things: associated costs (in terms of product
quality, product efficacy, and financial expense), and timeliness of implementation. In the
former case, a firm may have a substitute material available that is feasible but results in a lower
durability; an alternate material that meets minimum requirements but results in lower
performance; or the technological ability to extract a critical material from a product that has
reached end of life that is not economical. In the latter case, a firm may complete a product
redesign (which eliminates the need for critical material), only after it has lost most of its market
share due to a supply disruption.
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General Electric (GE) provides a real-world example of firm-level risk mitigation that found
success in terms of timely implementation but not cost. When confronted with a perceived
shortage of rhenium (a material critical to the manufacture of turbine engines), GE’s aviation
segment used a multiple step internal strategy to address the impact of an externally driven
supply disruption (Duclos, Otto et al. 2010). Below, we use GE’s strategy and the disruption
profile from Sheffi and Rice to demonstrate the firm-level impact and response (Sheffi and Rice
Jr 2005).
The first action taken by GE took place before the rhenium shortage occurred, corresponding
with the preparation stage of the disruption profile. By examining each material that it deemed
critical to its operations, GE was then able to evaluate each material based on four sub-risks: GE
% of world supply, impact on GE revenue, ability to use substitute materials, and ability to pass
through cost increases to consumers. Each of these sub-risks can be quantified and tracked using
internal data. Once known, additional preventive action can be taken such as hedging, securing
long-term supply agreements, material stockpiling, redesigning products to decrease material
utilization, and developing new technology that requires no or fewer critical materials.
After the disruptive event occurred (i.e. the perceived rhenium shortage), GE conducted a
material usage audit that was then used to determine sources and sinks of rhenium in the
products being manufactured. This corresponds with the first response stage of the disruption
profile and it enabled GE to fully assess its ability to internally mitigate the risk at hand. Next,
although GE couldn’t control the initial impact of the disruption, they could take steps to move
toward the recovery stage of the disruption profile. Beginning with the initial impact stage and
through the time of the full impact and preparation for recovery stages, GE took four actions
based on its assessment in the third stage of the disruption profile. First, GE employed a
common foundry practice called revert which allowed them to reuse casting waste. Second, GE
developed a chemical process that enabled them to reuse grinding chips of rhenium for high
value alloys. Third, GE developed a cleaning process to recycle material from products that
have reached end of life. Finally, GE developed two new alloys that require significantly less
rhenium content.
Having successfully reduced rhenium usage, GE entered the recovery stage. Based on the
information available, it’s difficult to gauge the long-term impact of the rhenium supply
disruption to GE but two conclusions can be drawn. First, although the turbine engines
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manufactured with the new alloys developed during the recovery phase of the supply disruption
did successfully operate, they were ultimately unviable from a business standpoint because the
reduction of rhenium resulted in decreased fuel efficiency (Duclos 2016). Second, despite the
market failure of the new alloys, GE was still able to mitigate risk by using internal data and
resources to minimize material waste and increase utilization efficiency.
3.4.

The Bullwhip Effect
In addition to understanding the mechanics of a supply disruption over the course of its

impact on an individual firm, broader market dynamics must be considered. One important
example of this is the supply chain and its many interdependencies, as illustrated by the bullwhip
effect. A phenomenon in which inventory levels get out of sync with demand, the bullwhip
effect causes companies to over- or under-order from suppliers, and results in artificially
amplified demand over time. The underlying disconnect between buyers and sellers throughout
the supply chain leads to increasing operational inefficiencies such as excess inventory, lack of
inventory, lost production time, lost sales, and, ultimately, lost profit and market share.
Lee et al. have identified four underlying mechanisms that cause the bullwhip effect: demand
forecast updating, order batching, price fluctuation, and rationing and shortage gaming (Lee,
Padmanabhan et al. 1997a, Lee, Padmanabhan et al. 1997b). Demand forecast updating is a
process in which firms determine future operational needs (e.g. materials, capacity, production
scheduling), based on historical sales. When a firm places an order based on this information,
the next level of the supply chain bases its production, including safety stock, on that signal.
Order batching happens when firms order periodically rather than based explicitly on demand
and when firms experience surges in demand (e.g. a new product is more popular than
forecasted). Rationing happens when demand exceeds supply and producers ration their
products in response. Shortage gaming is when customers exaggerate their orders to compensate
for rationing.
The triggering event of the bullwhip effect is an increase in demand at the downstream end of
the supply chain (in this case, aircraft orders from airlines). Represented by the yellow line in
the conceptual model in Figure 3.4.1., inventory levels begin to diverge after a modest increase
in demand at the retail level followed by increasing amplification further up the supply chain.
The retail inventory and backorder quantities fluctuate the least followed by the wholesale level,
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the distributor level, and finally the factory level. The areas of the graph in which some levels of
the supply chain have positive inventory levels, and some have backorders highlight potential
areas for supply disruption. For example, in the middle of the graph, the factory backlog is
extremely high and all other supply chain actors are reducing their backlogs. In response, both
the factory and the distributor next develop safety stocks that far surpass subsequent inventory
levels at the wholesaler and retailer levels of the supply chain. These fluctuations and
mismatches across supply chain actors result in inefficiencies that threaten a firm’s stability such
as higher raw material costs, carrying costs due to excess inventory, increased labor costs due to
overtime needed to fill overdue orders, and poor customer service.
Figure 3.4.1. Bullwhip Effect Conceptual Model
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The relevance of the bullwhip effect to firms that rely on critical materials, and therefore
often face supply disruptions, is an increase in the degree of uncertainty in risk measurement.
Firms can use performance metrics such as backlog (i.e. undelivered goods), fill rate (i.e. ratio of
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on time orders to late orders), zero-replenishment (i.e. the absence of orders from a tier in the
supply chain during a regular order period), and slope metrics (i.e. bullwhip slope, inventory
instability slope, and work in process instability slope), to mitigate risk in their own inventory
and supply levels, but they have to rely on market signals to measure this same risk beyond the
first tier in their supply chain (Cannella, Barbosa-Póvoa et al. 2013). This means that when the
supply chain experiences a bullwhip, each tier of the supply chain is faced with this same
dilemma, and the degree of uncertainty in risk measurement increases with each tier.
Figure 3.4.2. illustrates two of these key parameters for firms that greatly influence the
impact on them in the face of a supply disruption. The bullwhip effect can be illustrated by the
order penetration point, i.e., where in a typical process the firm lies in terms of delivering its
product. In the aerospace examples, those firms design to order and are therefore at the highest
order penetration point. In comparison, most consumer products and electronics are made to be
shipped directly to customers and have a low order penetration point (to the right on the Figure).
On the y-axis is the reliance of the industry on materials as it relates to profitability. Both
aerospace and the automotive industry for example, rely heavily on material price margins in
order to deliver on profitability. One can see that the aerospace case is therefore somewhat of an
extreme – a combination of both high order penetration point, and high reliance on materials in
their product.
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Reliance on Materials

Figure 3.4.2. Example order penetration point and reliance on materials for various industries
based on (Agarwal et al. 2012, Gaustad et al. 2017, Olhager 2003, Schoolderman & Mathlener
2011).
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3.5.

Firm-Level Indicators and Criticality Assessment Framework for Firms

A comprehensive set of indicators spanning six broad categories (i.e. demand risk,
environmental risk, geopolitical risk, market risk, scarcity, and supply chain), was identified in
our analysis of existing firm-level criticality assessment methods. In general, these indicators
were distributed fairly evenly as shown in Figure 3.5.1., with the highest percentage of indicators
being found in the Market Risk category. Although these indicators incorporate all three of the
core facets of sustainability (i.e. social, environmental, and financial), only 18% of them can be
considered internal indicators, meaning that they can be derived from data generated at the firm
level. Conversely, 82% of the indicators found can be characterized as external indicators. This
finding is consistent with our assertion that current criticality assessments rely primarily on
external data. Although external indicators—such as investment in mining, static reach reserves,
and sourcing and geopolitical risk—are important and pertinent to criticality assessment at all
levels, they can rarely be influenced by individual firms.
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In order to address the gap in firm-level criticality assessment methods, we further analyzed
our findings and identified four sub-categories of internal indicators among the 11 firm-level
studies reviewed: business risk, substitutability, supplier risk, and supply. As shown in Figure
3.5.1., 14 indicators concern business risk, 1 concerns substitutability, 1 concerns supplier risk,
and 1 concerns supply. This is instructive because it gives an indication of what data and metrics
are important and relevant to individual firms. For example, all of the business risk indicators
fall into the broader category of market risk which is a determinant of the market viability of
products.
Figure 3.5.1. Firm-Level Indicators by Category & Sub-Category

17%

16
14

Demand
Environmental
Geopolitical
Market Risk
Scarcity

10

6

6%
23%

18%

12

8

8%

28%

Supply Chain

Internal
External

4
2
0

As a first step toward developing a criticality framework designed specifically for use at the
firm level, five key components of assessment were identified: business purpose, application,
metrics, risk levels, and indicators (Griffin et al 2019). This structure is depicted in Figure 3.5.2.
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Each of these components reflects assessment approaches and trends across the 11 firm-level
studies. For instance, all of the firm-level studies incorporated metrics, risk levels, and
indicators. Specific assessment themes found in the existing firm-level studies that were
incorporated into the framework developed through this research include the treatment of risk,
business performance, substitutability, and product-based risk assessment. For example,
multiple studies employed unprescribed risk levels and control limits, and thresholds defined by
individual firms. Risk was often categorized qualitatively (e.g., very high, high, medium, low,
very low), and correlated to firm-determined control limits and thresholds that could be
qualitative (e.g., concentrated, high risk, some diversity and/or risk, U.S. based), or quantitative
(e.g., < 50%, 50% - 100%, 200% - 500%, >500%) (Duclos 2016, Rosenau-Tornow et al 2009,
Lloyd et al 2012a). Indicators were used to directly relate criticality risk to business performance
(e.g., impact on revenue, ability to pass through cost increases, demand risk) (Duclos 2016,
Lloyd et al 2012a, Lloyd et al 2012b, Miehe et al 2016, Kolotzek 2018). Rather than relying
solely on supplier metrics (e.g., number of suppliers available), some studies incorporated
metrics for substitutability in order to assess alternatives that firms have more control of and
better access to (Duclos 2016, Lloyd et al 2012a, Kolotzek 2018). Product-based risk assessment
was an approach used by four studies to understand risk exposure based on unit cost and revenue
(Duclos 2016, Lloyd et al 2012b, Miehe et al 2016, Kolotzek 2018).
Figure 3.5.2. Framework Structure for Firm-Level Criticality Assessment
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Using product viability in the context of market risk as a starting point, the emphasis of our
assessment framework is definitively on a firm-level scope rather than a market, industry,
national, or global one. The indicators themselves are correlated to three key functions present
in any firm: profitability, design and product concept viability, and production. Each of these
business elements has organization-wide impact and relies on resources and processes from
multiple areas across a firm. In addition, vulnerability in one or more of these areas can
constitute a threat to business sustainability. The purpose of this design is to produce
information that has universal relevance to firms, a connection to the fundamental tenets of
business noted above, a representation of cross-functional organizational dynamics (i.e. finance,
procurement, marketing, and production), and the availability and accessibility of the underlying
data in the regular course of business (Griffin et al 2019). A list of the specific indicators is
presented in Table 3.5.1.
Table 3.5.1. Criticality Indicators
Profitability
Finance

Indicator
Revenue

Definition
Income from sales of products
relying on critical material

Procurement

Price Volatility

Marketing

Price Elasticity

The percentage difference in the
price of a material over a given
period of time
The ratio of percentage change in
quantity demanded to percentage
change in price

Production

Substitutability

The extent to which it is possible to
substitute another material for a
critical material

Relevance
An indicator of risk exposure relative
to products that do not require critical
material
An indicator of market stability; high
levels of volatility signal high levels of
uncertainty and risk
An indicator of the responsiveness of
demand to changes in price; changes
in price that don’t impact demand are
inelastic vs. changes in price that do
impact demand which are elastic
Higher substitutability allows firms to
use alternative materials when faced
with supply disruptions due either to
cost or scarcity

43

Design & Product Concept Viability
Indicator
Material Fraction
of Total Material
Cost

Definition
Percentage of total product cost
from critical materials

Procurement

Supplier Risk

Availability of suppliers with
limited conduct violations

Marketing

Segment Market
Share

Percentage of total sales in a given
market segment

Production

Material
Utilization

Ratio of the raw material weight
used in production to the weight of
the finished product

Indicator
Gross Margin

Definition
Percentage of revenue retained as
gross profit

Procurement

Inventory
Variance Ratio

Ratio between inventory variance
magnitude and demand variance
ratio

Marketing

Supplier
Reliability
Production
Efficiency

The percentage of deliveries that are
on time and complete orders
Ability to produce the highest
quantity with the least resources at
the lowest cost and the highest
profit

Finance

Production
Finance

Production

Relevance
Indicator used to evaluate the
importance of a given critical material
with regard to product functionality
and value
If publicized, use of suppliers with
poor conduct can threaten the viability
of an entire firm
Market share is an indicator of relative
competitiveness and capacity to scale
operations
An indicator of material waste; higher
utilization reflects more efficient and
economical production

Relevance
The higher the percentage, the more
sales dollars retained which can be
used to cover costs and service debts;
a measure of organizational stability
A quantification of inventory
fluctuation that signals changes in
holding and backlog costs, and can be
used to measure inflated average
inventory cost per period; higher
ratios signal higher holding and
backlog costs
Production delays due to raw material
delay can be extremely expensive
A decrease in production efficiency
could signal a supply problem

Combined with the indicators, the framework also reflects findings from each of the case
studies presented in this work. In the aviation case, the concurrence observed between firm
performance and the price volatility of rhenium informed three of the indicators included our
framework: revenue, price volatility, and gross margin. Analysis of price volatility informed
another indicator, material fraction of total material cost. In the controlled environment
agriculture (CEA) case, concurrence was again observed between price volatility and firm
performance. However, in the CEA case, impacts to firm performance were in terms of not just
profitability but of product viability.
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In the aviation case, the impact of a rhenium supply disruption does not immediately threaten
production because manufacturers do have access to substitute materials and because the
material fraction of total cost is quite low. This means that, although the manufacturer may incur
a higher cost of production, production itself is not immediately vulnerable. This is also related
to the fact that aircraft manufacturing is a niche market with extremely long lead times.
Switching costs are very high once a purchasing contract has been executed and there are very
few competitors in the market. Using substitutes decreases engine efficiency and performance
but does not compromise the overall integrity of the product.
In the CEA case, on the other hand, supply disruptions threaten production more quickly and
more severely. There are two reasons for this. First, the lighting industry is low margin and
extremely competitive. There are many manufacturers and switching costs are low. Second, if
substitute materials are used to manufacture horticultural LED lamps, the characteristics of the
light that they emit can be substantively altered. Given the highly customized nature of
horticultural LED lamps (which is part and parcel of their value proposition), if there is a critical
material supply disruption or price spike, consumers will be quickly incented to purchase an
alternative, less expensive technology. However, in the form presented in Table 3.5.1., this set
of internal indicators does not stand alone. So why would a firm want to use this tool?
A fundamental characteristic of the indicators is that it does not specify the scope of
criticality or risk to be measured. Each firm has unique needs and circumstances (e.g., firm size,
segment, industry, type, and number of products). In designing the tool with limited structure, it
can be used to focus on a specific raw material; a particular product or group of products;
product or segment profitability; sales volume; research and development; or other priorities. In
this way, the tool addresses inter and intra firm variability and can be uniquely adopted by any
organization. Given its underlying function—to assess criticality risk—the most important
flexible aspect of the tool is the lack of defined risk limits. The reason firms need a firm-level
assessment methodology that relies on internal data is that the existing criticality assessment
frameworks measure aggregate risk that does not take into account firm-specific parameters such
as working capital, number of suppliers, labor available, specificity limits (i.e., process and
product performance targets), and control limits (i.e., allowable performance variation). This
tool enables a firm to set unique control limits on degrees of risk and establish indicator bounds
that reflect its specific circumstances, priorities, and strategies (Griffin et al 2019).
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Defining criticality risk based on internal conditions using internal metrics represents the
ultimate utility of the tool. When the value of an internal indicator changes from one reporting
period to another, firms can mitigate (or capitalize) on it through internal action. When external
factors impact an individual firm, the only course of action is to react. For example, if a firm
identifies a decrease in supplier reliability it can investigate this signal to determine if the cause
lies with a specific supplier or if the change is a harbinger of broader supply chain delays.
Similarly, if a firm determines that substitutability is low for a particular product group of
products, it might try to develop its own substitute material or diversify its product offerings to
include products with high substitutability.
The tool can also be used to help firms strategically manage unforeseen negative events (i.e.
Black Swans). When a firm defines control limits and risk thresholds specific to its own
operations (rather than national or global criteria), it can not only measure variability, but
benchmark variability against its own limits. In so doing, the firm can characterize a supply
disruption in terms of the appropriate response. When firms experience variations that are within
control limits, they can revise risk thresholds to improve signaling. When firms experience
variations that are beyond control limits, there is a bigger problem. An example of the difference
between variations within and beyond control limits is a delay in shipment versus a price spike.
If production slows or target delivery dates are compromised because a critical material is
temporarily unavailable, variation is within control limits and a firm can likely survive the
disruption. If the cost of a critical material suddenly and unexpectedly increases dramatically,
variation is beyond control limits and a firm may not survive the disruption. The framework
developed here is meant to address this variability so that it can be uniquely adopted by any
organization. It also aims to provide an approach to criticality assessment that can be distilled
into a firm-level scorecard that can be used to track and predict risk. An example of what a firmlevel scorecard might look like is presented in Table 6.4. in Appendix B (Griffin et al 2019).
More specifically, the framework can be implemented starting with just one material,
product, or segment of focus. The next step would be for the firm to identify sources of data and
any related parameters from existing internal reporting. For example, revenue from the material,
product, or segment being analyzed as a percentage of total firm revenue could come from
marketing, sales, or finance. Given this information, a firm should next define risk thresholds
and control limits. For example, if revenue drops by X%, the firm will stop its production.
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Similarly, a high level of risk might be defined as a decrease in revenue of Y% compared to a
moderate level of risk which is defined as no change in revenue, or a low level of risk which is
defined as Z% increase in revenue (Griffin et al 2019).
In general, the risk levels defined by each firm are most useful when they correspond to a
range of quantitative metrics. This is important because the risk level and underlying ranges of
values represent another way that firms can operationalize the framework to suit their individual
needs. For example, the dispersion of supplier reliability values may be wider for a firm with
readily accessible secondary suppliers compared to a firm with only one supplier for a particular
material or component. Similarly, a firm that relies on a critical material for 5% of its revenue
has more relaxed constraints compared to a firm that relies on a critical material for 50% of its
revenue.
A further consideration regarding criticality risk assessment is the relationship between the
indicator and the timing of the decision(s) that it informs. Generally, business performance
management consists of both leading and lagging indicators. Leading indicators are predictive in
nature in that they are meant to inform decisions that precede an economic impact or change.
They are also a crucial element of an efficient and effective framework. For example,
substitutability—the extent to which it is possible to substitute another material for a critical
material—is something that can be evaluated prior to a supply disruption. If there is a high level
of substitutability, supply disruption risk is low, and a firm can expect to be able to effectively
manage such an occurrence by simply using an alternative, readily available material. In this
case the firm may decide to start or continue production of a technology involving critical
materials. If there is a low level of substitutability, a firm can use this information to make
decisions about whether it will manufacture a product at all and, if so, what kind of commitments
it will make to its clients (e.g. number of products manufactured per period), and how much
margin it is willing to absorb if a supply disruption increases the cost of delivery to the client.
Conversely, lagging indicators are meant to inform decisions that follow an economic impact and
to substantiate trends and patterns. For example, price volatility—the percentage difference in
the price of a material over a given period of time—is an indicator of market stability. By
monitoring price volatility, a firm can make decisions about which products to produce when and
in what quantities, based on the levels of uncertainty and risk reflected in historical data (Griffin
et al 2019).
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While there is latitude with regard to how a given organization can implement the firm-level
criticality framework, there are a number of considerations to be made. First, although historical
trends may be useful in understanding and assessing criticality, the framework is designed to be
used on a more dynamic basis. For instance, the use of internal metrics (which are generated and
available in the normal course of business), is intended to shorten the time between data
generation and criticality assessment in order to improve the timeliness of firm response to a
predicted or observed supply disruption. The framework should be updated quarterly at a
minimum. This time period was chosen for a number of reasons: it is a common reporting
period, annual data may no longer be relevant by the time it is available, and correlation can be
seen on a quarterly basis. Second, the framework can and should be used to inform a firm’s
mitigation strategy choices. For example, the price volatility metric can be used in combination
with the material fraction of product cost and price elasticity to determine whether a firm should
invest resources to redesign a particular product or simply maintain modest safety stock.
Similarly, a firm could use segment market share and supplier risk to negotiate long-term
contracts with suppliers. Finally, the framework is designed to leverage existing internal
business data to give the firm information that it can use to directly influence internal outcomes.
Although there are salient external factors and data sources related to material criticality, the
focus here is on factors over which firms have some degree of control (Griffin et al).
3.6.

The Role of the Organization
Critical material risk assessment and mitigation have been extensively studied from

perspectives external to individual firms such as physical availability, geopolitical conflict,
global demand, and environmental hazards (see Table 6.1. in Appendix B). While relevant and
impactful at the firm level, these factors are largely outside the control and influence of
individual businesses. Conversely, firms can influence internal factors (e.g. product allocation,
capital expenditures, supply chain strategy, research and development investment), that drive
their individual profitability, design and product concept viability, and production efficiency. In
fact, business organizations routinely compile data and prepare both internal and external reports
to do so. Some of these include quarterly and annual financial reports, legally mandated tax and
SEC filings, accounting audits, and assurance audits. It follows then that, conceptually, firms
should be able to leverage existing data and reporting structures to assess criticality risk. In
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practice, however, there is little evidence of this approach. One reason for this may be that, just
as the impacts of supply disruptions effect areas across an organization, remedies are also
influenced by multiple areas and therefore can’t be implemented by any one department or
functional area alone. That is, the organizational structure of a firm plays a central role in its
ability or inability to assess and mitigate criticality risk.
One practical demonstration of this dynamic is the dependency between research and
development and procurement. Without information from a firm’s research and development
resources, procurement won’t be able to contract the correct quantities and types of materials.
This is especially relevant when a firm is ready to scale up from a prototype (i.e., one unit) to full
scale production (i.e., dozens, hundreds, thousands, or even millions of units) because of the
significant increase in volume. Without procurement, research and development won’t know
what alternate materials are available in what quantities and at what cost, and they won’t know if
procuring the necessary materials is possible or financially feasible. Both of these scenarios
limit a firm’s ability to effectively respond to a supply disruption. The former situation could,
for example, result in production delays and compromise profits. Similarly, the latter situation
could lead to the development of a new product that is cost prohibitive to implement at scale.
Using the internal criticality indicators in Table 3.5.1., Table 3.6.1. provides several examples of
the relationship between organizational structure and risk assessment in an individual firm.
Table 3.6.1. Internal Criticality Indicator Data and Sources at the Firm Level
Profitability
Indicator
Revenue

Price Volatility
Price Elasticity

Substitutability

Information Needed
Products containing critical
materials
# of units sold / sales volume
$ per unit, per product
Material pricing data over time
Supplier contracts
Sales volume
Pricing data over time
Ability to pass on cost increase

Source of Information
Research & Development

Org. Position
Materials Engineer

Accounting and Finance
Marketing
Procurement
Procurement
Accounting and Finance
Procurement
Marketing

Product material composition
Change-order cycle time
Technical feasibility of
substitution

Research & Development
Production
Research & Development

Accountant
Marketing Manager
Cost Estimator
Purchasing Agent
Accountant
Cost Estimator
Market Research
Analyst
Materials Engineer
Industrial Engineer
Materials Engineer
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Design & Product Concept Viability
Indicator
Material Fraction of
Total Material Cost
Supplier Risk
Segment Market
Share

Material Utilization

Information Needed
Product material composition
Cost of critical materials used
Total cost of materials used
Number of suppliers
Supplier contract details
Lead time by supplier
Revenue per product / business
unit
Total segment revenue

Source of Information
Research & Development
Procurement
Procurement
Procurement
Procurement
Procurement
Accounting and Finance

Org. Position
Materials Engineer
Purchasing Agent
Purchasing Agent
Purchasing Manager
Purchasing Manager
Purchasing Agent
Accountant

Marketing

Sales volume
Design specified composition
Actual composition
Ability to reclaim materials
Materials reclaimed

Accounting and Finance
Research & Development
Production
Research & Development
Production

Market Research
Analyst
Accountant
Materials Engineer
Industrial Engineer
Materials Engineer
Industrial Engineer

Information Needed
Revenue
Cost of goods sold
Fluctuations in net inventory

Source of Information
Accounting and Finance
Accounting and Finance
Production

Fluctuations in demand

Marketing

Sales lost to supply issues

Production

Rate of delivery delay / failure
# of goods produced / # of goods
scheduled to be produced
Margin of goods produced /
margin of goods scheduled to be
produced
Technical feasibility of
substitution

Procurement
Production

Org. Position
Accountant
Accountant
Supply Chain
Manager
Market Research
Analyst
Supply Chain
Manager
Purchasing Agent
Production Manager

Accounting and Finance

Accountant

Research & Development

Materials Engineer

Production
Indicator
Gross Margin
Inventory Variance
Ratio
Supplier Reliability
Production
Efficiency

The information in Table 3.6.1. highlights the definitive challenge faced by firms contending
with criticality assessment and mitigation: effective cross functional communication and
collaboration. Across 16 indicators in 3 primary business functions there are a minimum of 33
types of information needed from 5 major functional areas and 11 organizational roles.
Although some pieces of data are used for multiple indicators (e.g. sales volume, revenue,
material pricing), only one of 16 indicators does not require information from at least two
organizational positions. Further complicating matters is variation in data units (e.g.
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quantitative, qualitative, discrete, binary, ordinal, etc.), reporting baselines, and the timeliness of
available information, all of which undermine the goal of criticality assessment and mitigation.
A comprehensive assessment of a firm’s risk environment is an important objective of the
firm level criticality indicators such as those in the framework in Table 6.3. in Appendix B.
However, in order to accomplish this, risk monitoring and mitigation must be integrated into
broader firm practices and a complementary ethos must be diffused throughout the organization.
Without management support and a firm culture congruent with cross-functional collaboration
and information sharing, the firm-level approach to criticality is likely to fail, particularly in
organizations that follow a silo structure or a rigid hierarchical structure. In addition to firm
culture and organizational structure, the success of firm level criticality mitigation is dependent
on communication with management and key decision makers. Given the complexity of
criticality, the importance of clear, concise communication about supply risk and mitigation to
management cannot be understated. Particularly in cases where the appropriate mitigation
strategy is cost and resource intensive (e.g. product re-design or new material development),
leadership buy-in is crucial.

Conclusions
In this paper we presented a review of literature addressing firm-level criticality and
conducted a two-part gap analysis to better understand the differences among current approaches
and scopes of criticality management. The first component of the research gap that this work
attempts to fill is to understand some of the specific ways that individual firms are impacted by
criticality. To do so, we considered criticality in terms of commonly understood and commonly
experienced threats to firm viability such as loss of revenue, loss of market share, and loss of
profit. Although this is a large and complex question that remains incompletely answered, this
work does identify specific firm-level costs related to criticality. For example, in the RollsRoyce scenario in the aviation case, we established the material intensity of rhenium by mass and
cost in one Trent XWB engine. Using this information along with publicly available data about
the list price of these engines, the gross margin earned by these engines, and historical rhenium
prices, it was determined that the 2008 spike in the price of rhenium was equal to a loss of almost
10% in gross margin relative to the 2017 price of rhenium.
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Although the controlled environment agriculture case doesn’t demonstrate specific firm-level
costs related to criticality, it does demonstrate specific impacts. For example, manufacturers of
LED lighting used in horticultural applications face strong competing demand and price
competition. Whereas the demand for rhenium is concentrated in the aviation industry, there are
multiple uses for each critical material needed to manufacture LED grow lights, as well as
multiple uses for LEDs themselves. Second, in their annual SEC 10-K filings, LED
manufacturer CREE explicitly acknowledges the firm’s vulnerability to supply constraints
outside of its control, such as reliance on sole or limited source suppliers. CREE also reports
impacts that include high price volatility and variation in consistency and availability. Finally,
CREE makes note of the cost and difficulty of complying with regulations, such as the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, on material sourced from areas of
geopolitical conflict.
Both cases offer a second insight to specific firm-level costs. In the aviation case we plotted
the price of rhenium against firm-level financial performance data over time. Using annual and
quarterly revenue and profit results from Boeing, General Electric Aviation, and Pratt & Whitney
we established correlational industry trends in line with the Rolls-Royce findings. In the
controlled environment agriculture case, we plotted the price of rare earth elements and gallium
against the annual financial performance of CREE, a major manufacturer of LEDs used for
horticultural lighting applications. The ways and extents to which both aviation and horticultural
lighting manufacturing firms are impacted by criticality are extremely complex and are not yet
causally substantiated. However, these findings establish a basis for pursuing the next
component of the research gap addressed by this work: how can firms create a criticality risk
assessment framework that can be used efficiently and effectively for their specific business
operations and strategies? That is, how can individual firms monitor critical material supply
risk?
In addressing the second component of the research gap, we found that critical material
supply risk assessment has two primary characteristics across existing frameworks and
approaches, independent of the size and scope of the assessing entity. The first is the
quantification of externally driven risk factors such as geological and economic availability;
policy and regulation; geopolitical risk; environmental risk; etc. Although different firms do use
some of the same indicators, they also use some unique indicators. The second characteristic is
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that criticality is generally addressed on an aggregate basis (e.g. global, national, industry), rather
than on an individual firm basis. While fundamentally relevant to criticality, we assert that
external factors can’t be directly controlled by individual firms. Similarly, criticality challenges
faced by firms necessarily vary from those faced at the industry level or above. Finally, because
firms inherently differ in size, scope, and resources, the focus on external factors also presents a
challenge to successful criticality mitigation at the firm level.
Given these findings and the resulting conclusion that no existing criticality assessment
framework was sufficient for individual firms, the main contribution of this paper is a criticality
assessment framework that uses dynamic, micro-level, internal indicators to guide firm decisionmaking related specifically to criticality risk at the firm level. Risk analysis was used to develop
a new framework to be used by firms with existing, internal, firm-level data. Potential threats to
an uninterrupted material supply (e.g. price volatility, supplier reliability, substitutability) were
determined, and correlations between potential events and likely outcomes were identified (e.g.
loss of revenue due to a price spike in a material needed to produce a good with a high material
fraction of product cost).
Although we contend that all of the metrics proposed in the firm-level criticality framework
are relevant to all firms, there are no doubt metrics not included that are necessary for some firms
and not others, as well as some metrics in our framework that are more or less relevant across
firms. Therefore, the framework needs to be integrated into individual firm decision-making
processes and adapted as appropriate; this requires some interpretation and analysis by individual
firms. For example, selection criteria and indicator weightings will vary across and within firms
based on things like which critical materials are used and the market characteristics of the
products being manufactured with those materials. One application may be more susceptible to
low production efficiency and another may be more vulnerable to price elasticity.
As shown in the criticality assessment tool, some indicators will have higher risk than others.
Sensitivity analysis should be conducted to determine the appropriate risk levels for each
indicator used to assess criticality at a given firm. A similar approach is recommended for
evaluating supply risk mitigation strategies which will impact firms differently. For example,
one firm may benefit greatly from using long-term supply agreements whereas another firm may
be better off developing a substitute material or increasing material utilization. Integration of the
framework also requires buy-in from internal stakeholders throughout the organization, starting
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with management. Similarly, internal data related to supply is still, to some extent, contingent on
the knowledge and activities of stakeholders up the supply chain. That is, some “internal” data
requires external input and insight. For example, material cost data can be elusive and time
consuming to identify in large supply chains, especially when firms purchase components and
parts rather than raw material. This lack of supply chain transparency is an anticipated barrier to
successful implementation of the framework.

4.1.

Recommendations for Future Research
This research has led to several key findings about the way we think about, measure,

monitor, and value critical materials. It has also uncovered opportunities for firms to improve
their analysis of metrics relevant to criticality risk. One way to help companies do this is to
apply the framework proposed in this work to real world data from companies that need to
manage criticality risk. Doing so would allow us to explore different ways that firms might use
and interpret the indicators in general. For example, can the indicators be used to effectively
identify thresholds or tipping points beyond which risk exceeds a firm’s tolerance? Which
indicators do firm’s find most useful? Does the utility of a given indicator vary across market
segments or industries? Another area of exploration is the impact of integrated supply chains on
criticality mitigation. Can large conglomerates actually influence the production of critical
materials, or are broader market forces that cause supply disruptions more powerful? Are there
manufacturing companies that own mines or rights to mines used to produce critical materials?
If so, is this strategy cost effective? Future research should also address how firms might use
modular manufacturing to mitigate risk; is it feasible to design technologies with contingency
components in case of supply disruption?
This work focuses squarely on the firm perspective because, through their decision making,
firms have considerable influence on the direction and progression of technology which, in turn,
has ramifications for advancements in sustainability. Specifically, we focus on manufacturing
firms at the upper end of the supply chain. However, because the impacts of criticality aren’t
contained to any one tier in the supply chain, another important area of future research is the
impact of criticality to stakeholders across the supply chain. For example, in the aviation case
some additional stakeholders include the airlines that purchase aircraft, the consumers who travel
by air, and businesses and organizations that rely on air transport. In other words, the cost and
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availability of fuel-efficient jet engines have macro level economic implications. Without the
ability to affordably move people and goods in a timely fashion, barriers to economic growth and
technological advancement—such as increased cost, decreased performance, and decreased
productivity—begin to emerge. In the controlled environment agriculture case, additional
stakeholders include the farmers who rely on horticultural lighting to produce food as well as
food distributors, food retailers, restaurants, and all consumers. The cost and availability of
lighting needed for agriculture have wide-reaching impacts ranging from the profitability of food
production to the availability and accessibility of food. As growing conditions change and
present new challenges stemming from climate change, it becomes more difficult to maintain
yields and less profitable to produce food in the first place.
The research presented here addresses the use of critical materials in two industries, aviation
and controlled environment agriculture. While we did compare and contrast the ways that each
of these industries is impacted by critical material supply disruptions, we did not address the
broader impact of competition for the same materials across industries. One example of crossindustry competition for critical materials relates to LEDs because there are many different
technologies that rely on this technology. These applications include general lighting, controlled
environment agriculture (i.e. horticultural lighting), electronics (e.g., TVs, smartphones, video
displays), and medical treatments such as LED phototherapy. If there is a scarcity event causing
a price spike in the critical materials needed to manufacture LEDs, the impact will, in general,
vary by industry. However, one industry of particular note is food production. Given that food
security is now tied to criticality (due to the projected growth of controlled environment
agriculture that relies heavily on LED lighting), future work should emphasize impact beyond a
firm’s financial bottom line.
Although this work is very price focused due to its emphasis on the criticality impact to
firms, it’s important to think about how environmental regulations might disrupt supply chains.
Future work should investigate firm risk on the basis of exposure to environmental issues which
may include soil, air, and water contamination; radioactive waste; and carbon emissions.
Finally, future work should apply a formal, systems thinking approach to identify
interdependencies within and between firms that impact criticality mitigation. This should focus
on the organizational design, communication, and culture within a specific firm, and how those
elements impact effective business practices and critical material supply chain resilience.
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Appendix A
5.1.

Cobalt Criticality
Cobalt is a critical metal used in a broad array of products including aircraft engines,

turbines, magnets, and cutting tools. Because two of cobalt’s most notable characteristics
include extremely high supply concentration and constant price volatility, it serves as an
instructive example for understanding the firm level impact of criticality.
In the early 1970s, 40% of all land based cobalt reserves were in Zaire (currently known as
the Democratic Republic of Congo). Zaire and neighboring Zambia controlled 2/3 of world
production of cobalt. During this period, the U.S. (which did not produce any cobalt
domestically), was the world’s largest consumer of cobalt but had access to just one supplier of
Zairian cobalt, the African Metals Corporation. As shown in Figure 5.1., price volatility is
evident in the periods from 1966 to 1976 and from 1980 to 2002 during which year-over-year
cobalt price changes were as high as 41%. The most famous and drastic cobalt price spike
followed a political rebellion in Zaire (Alonso et al 2007). Between 1977 and 1979, prices
increased by as much as 380%, causing firms to reevaluate products, production technologies,
and sourcing routes (Alonso et al 2007). The impact was so great that even national policies
were changed (Alonso et al 2007).
Outcomes from market instability-derived supply problems extended from price increases to
product changes requiring substitution and new material development. The extent of the
outcomes appears to have been exacerbated by the high global dependence on production from a
single region, Zaire’s Shaba province, and by the importance of cobalt for crucial defense
applications. Although many of the factors contributing to cobalt price instability over the past
50 years are external, and therefore outside of the control of individual firms (e.g. political
rebellion, global macroeconomic trends, production capacity, refining capacity, and
transportation routes), cobalt is an apt example for our purposes because it highlights how
material availability affects individual firms and what individual firms have done to mitigate it.
Forced to reevaluate their production options in light of cobalt cost increases, firms responded by
using material substitution, developing new technologies, identifying alternative material
suppliers and sources, hoarding and rationing, and reclamation and recycling. For example, the
magnet industry substituted lower cobalt containing alloys for applications with limitations on
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weight, size, and energy (USGS, 2006). Similarly, although reducing the use of cobalt in
superalloys was difficult due to limited substitutes and a simultaneous increase in demand for jet
engines, the development of a recycling process for scrap superalloys doubled cobalt recovery
after 1978 (Blechman, 1985).
Figure 5.1.1. Price Volatility of Cobalt, 1950 – 2008
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Appendix B
6.1.

Criticality Assessment Literature Summary

Table 6.1.1. Criticality Assessment Literature Summary
Author(s)

Affiliated Institution(s)

Scope(s)

Scotland and Northern Ireland
Forum for Environmental
Research (SNIFFER)
Scottish Environment
Protection Agency (SEPA)
Northern Ireland Environment
(NIEA)
University of Augsburg

Scotland

Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs
Fraunhofer ISI

UK
Germany

Technische Universität Berlin

National

U.S. Department of Energy

Global

Enhancing the assessment of critical resource use at the country level
with the SCARCE method–Case study of Germany
Critical Materials Strategy
Critical Materials Strategy

1

AEA Technology
(2010)

2

6

Achzet and Helbig
(2013)
AEA Technology
(2010)
Angerer et al.
(2009)
Bach et al.
(2017)
Bauer et al. (2010)

7

Bauer et al. (2011)

U.S. Department of Energy

Global

8

Bensch et al. (2015)

University of Augsburg

Firm

9

Blengini et al.
(2017)

EU

10

Brown (2018)

European Commission, DG
Joint Research Centre,
Ispra, Italy
European Commission, DG
Joint Research Center,
Petten, Netherdands
European Commission, DG
GROW
Brussels, Belgium
Politecnico di Torino
British Geological Survey

11

Buchert, Schüler et
al. (2009)

12
13

British Geological
Survey (2015)
Daw (2017)

14
15

3
4
5

16

Global

Global

Title
Raw Materials Critical to the Scottish Economy

How to Evaluate Raw Material Supply Risks – An Overview
Review of the Future Resource Risks Faced by UK Business and an
Assessment of Future Viability
Raw Materials for Emerging Technologies

Decision Support System for the Sustainability Assessment of Critical
Raw Materials in SMEs
EU methodology for critical raw materials assessment: Policy needs
and proposed solutions for incremental improvements

Measurement of mineral supply diversity and its importance in
assessing risk and criticality
Critical Metals for Future Sustainable Technologies and their
Recycling Potential

Öko-Institut e.V.
United Nations Environment
Programme
British Geological Survey

Global

Université Paris

National

Duclos et al. (2010)

GE

Firm

European
Commission (2010)
European
Commission (2014)

Fraunhofer ISI

EU

Critical Raw Materials for the EU

Fraunhofer ISI
Oakdene Hollins
Roskill
Deloitte Sustainability
British Geological Survey
Bureau de Recherces
Géologiques et Minières
Netherlands Organisation for
Applied Scientific Research

EU

Report on Critical Materials for the EU

EU

Study on the Review of the List of Critical Raw Materials

Loughborough University

Firm

17

European
Commission (2017)

18

Gardner et al.
(2016)

Global

Risk List 2015: An update to the supply risk index for elements or
element groups that are of economic value
Security of mineral resources: A new framework for quantitative
assessment
of criticality
Design in an Era of Constrained Resources

A Framework for the Resilient Use of Critical Materials in Sustainable
Manufacturing Systems
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19
20

Gardner et al.
(2018)
Glöser-Chahoud et
al. (2016)

Loughborough University

Firm

Fraunhofer ISI

National
Global
National
Firm
Global
National
Firm
Global
National
Firm
Global
National
Firm
Firm

21

Graedel et al.
(2012)

Yale University

22

Graedel et al.
(2014)

Yale University

23

Graedel et al.
(2015)

Yale University

24

Graedel et al.
(2015)

Yale University

25

Hallstedt et al.
(2017)
Hatayama and
Tahara (2015)

27

Hatayama and
Tahara (2018)

28

Helbig et al. (2016)

Blekinge Institute of
Technology
National Institute of Advanced
Industrial Science and
Technology
National Institute of Advanced
Industrial Science and
Technology
University of Augsburg

29

Helbig et al. (2017)

University of Augsburg

30

Jasiński et al.
(2018)

31

Knobloch et al.
(2018)

32
33

Kolotzek et al.
(2018)
Lapko et al. (2016)

University of Warwick
University of Coimbra
University of Sheffield
University of Bremen
Ökopol – Institute for
Environmental Studies
University of Augsburg

34

26

National
Global
Global
National
Firm
Global
Global
Global
National
Firm
Firm
Firm

Lloyd et al. (2011)

Politecnico di Milano
KTH Royal Institute of
Technology
Rolls Royce

35

Lloyd et al. (2012)

Rolls Royce

Firm

36

Miehe et al. (2016)

Fraunhofer ISI

Firm

37

Morley & Eatherley
(2008)

UK

38

Nassar et al. (2015)

Resource Efficiency
Knowledge Transfer Network
Oakdene Hollins
Yale University

39

Nassar et al. (2015)

Yale University

40

Nieto et al. (2013)

41

National Research
Council (2008)
Rosenau-Tornow et
al. (2009)

The Pennsylvania State
University
The National Academies

42

Volkswagen AG
Federal Institute for
Geosciences and Natural
Resources (BGR)

Firm

Global
National
Firm
Global
National
Firm
US
Global

A framework and decision support tool for improving value chain
resilience to critical materials in manufacturing
Taking the Step towards a More Dynamic View on
Raw Material Criticality: An Indicator Based Analysis
for Germany and Japan
Methodology of Criticality Determination
Metal resources, use and criticality (in Critical Materials Handbook)
On the Materials Basis of Modern Society
Criticality of metals and metalloids
Material Criticality Assessment in Early Phases of Sustainable Product
Development
Criticality assessment of metals for Japan’s resource strategy
Adopting an objective approach to criticality assessment: Learning
from the
past
How to Evaluate Raw Material Vulnerability – An Overview
Benefits of resource strategy for sustainable materials research and
development
Assessing supply risks for non-fossil mineral resources via multicriteria decision analysis
From criticality to vulnerability of resource supply: The case of the
automobile industry
A Company-Oriented Model for the Assessment of Raw Material
Supply Risks, Environmental Impact and Social Implications
The Business Perspective on Materials Criticality: Evidence from
Manufacturers
Ecodesign through Environmental Risk Management: A Focus on
Critical Materials
A Framework for Environmental Risk Management
Criticality of material resources in industrial enterprises – Structural
basics of an operational model
Material Security: Ensuring Resource Availability for the UK
Economy
By-Product Metals are Technologically Essential but Have
Problematic Supply
Criticality of the rare earth elements
Addressing Criticality for Rare Earth Elements in Petroleum Refining:
The Key Supply Factors Approach
Minerals, Critical Minerals, and the U.S. Economy
Assessing the Long-Term Supply Risks for Mineral Raw Materials – a
Combined Evaluation of Past and Future Trends
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6.2.

Regulatory and Compliance Indicators

Table 6.2.1. Regulatory and Compliance Indicators

Indicator
Impact of ecological implications on biodiversity (using ReCiPe)
Environmental regulation (e.g. policy decisions, legislation)

Category
Environment
Environment

Socio- and ecological impact risk
Anthropogenic vs. natural flows
Impact of ecological implications on human health (using
ReCiPe)
Likelihood of substance becoming unavailable due to the
Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of
Chemicals regulation (REACH)
Electric vehicle (ELV) directive non-compliance
Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of
Chemicals regulation
(REACH) non-compliance
Restriction of Hazardous Substances (RoHS) non-compliance
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) noncompliance
Emissions legislation non-compliance
The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (re: human
trafficking and slavery)
Conflict Elements

Environment
Environment
Environment

Study
Bensch et al. 2015
Gardner et al. 2018;
Hallstedt et al. 2017;
Nieto et al. 2013
Hallstedt et al. 2017
Hallstedt et al. 2017
Bensch et al. 2015

Environment

Lloyd et al. 2012

Environment
Environment

Lapko et al. 2016
Lapko et al. 2016

Environment
Environment

Lapko et al. 2016
Lapko et al. 2016

Geopolitical
Supply Chain

Lapko et al. 2016
Lapko et al. 2016

Supply Chain

Gardner et al. 2018;
Hallstedt et al. 2017

6.3.

Indicators in Existing Firm-Level Criticality Studies

Indicator

Business Risk

Impact on revenue

Internal

X

Business Risk

Ability to pass on cost

Internal

X

Business Risk

Vulnerability

Internal

Business Risk

Severity of impact of risk

Internal

X

Business Risk

Sales of product(s) containing
critical material(s) as a percentage
of total sales

Internal

X

Nieto et al (2013)

Category

Hallstedt et al (2017)

Gardner et al (2016)

Lapko et al (2016)

Kolotzek et al (2018)

Bensch et al (2015)
SMEs

Rosenau-Tornow et al (2009)
VW

Lloyd et al (2012)
Rolls Royce

Lloyd et al (2011)
Rolls Royce

Scope

Duclos et al (2010)
GE

Table 6.3.1. Indicators in Existing Firm-Level Criticality Studies

X
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Business Risk

Current revenue from product(s)
containing critical material(s)

Internal

X

Business Risk

Future projected revenue from
product(s) containing critical
material(s)

Internal

X

Business Risk

Potential cost increase

Internal

X

X

X

Business Risk

Unit cost of component/product
containing critical material(s)

Internal

X

X

X

Business Risk

Unit cost of critical material(s) in
component/product

Internal

X

X

X

Business Risk

Internal

X

X

X

Business Risk

Fraction of whole material cost for
unit
Production costs (cash costs)

Business Risk

Risk to key customers

Internal

Business Risk

Material / component lead time

External

X

Business Risk

Concentration of revenue in few
clients
Non-forecasted upside demand

Internal

X

Internal

X

Internal

X

Business Risk

Delivery capability (vs lead
time/shortages)
Cost competition

External

X

Business Risk

Price pressure

External

X

Co-Production Risk

Co-production risk

External

Co-Production Risk

External

Co-Production Risk

By-product character / coproduction
Companion metal fraction

Demand Risk

Demand risk

External

Demand Risk

Demand growth

External

X

X

X

Demand Risk

Competing demand for a material

External

X

X

X

Demand Risk

External

Demand Risk

Demand from alternative
applications
Demand increase risk

External

X

X

Demand Risk

Future demand technology

External

X

X

Demand Risk

Demand fluctuation

External

Environmental

Environmental regulation (e.g.
policy decisions, legislation)

External

X

Environmental

Soci- and ecological impact risk

External

X

Environmental

Anthropogenic vs natural flows

External

X

Environmental

External

Environmental

Social and environmental
restrictions
Damage to health and ecosystems

Environmental

Environmental regulations

External

Exploration and/or
Mining

Lack of investments in exploration
of new sources

External

X

Exploration and/or
Mining
Exploration and/or
Mining

Degree of exploration

External

X

Investment in mining

External

X

Business Risk
Business Risk

Internal

X
X

X

X
X

External

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

External

X

X
X

61

Geopolitical

Sourcing and geopolitical risk

External

X

Geopolitical

External

Geopolitical

Political stability in sourcing
countries
Instability of producing country

Geopolitical

Stability of producing country

External

Geopolitical

Country related risk

External

Geopolitical

International trade environment

External

Geopolitical

Political risk

External

X

X

Geopolitical

Country risk political stability

External

X

X

Geopolitical

Country risk policy potential

External

X

X

Geopolitical

Country risk regulation

External

X

X

Geopolitical

Export quotas

External

Physical, Geological
Abundance
Physical, Geological
Abundance
Price

Abundance in earth's crust

External

Geological measures
(abundance/scarcity)
Historic price volatility

External

Price

Material cost increase

External

Price

Sensitivity to price fluctuation

External

Price

Price of critical material

External

Price

Price volatility

External

Price

Price fluctuations

External

X

Price

Price increase

External

X

Production Capacity

Time needed to expand production
capacity (exploration of new
sources)

External

X

Production Capacity

Limited production and capacity of
mine, smelter, refinery, freight

External

X

Production Capacity

Mine/refinery capacity utilization

External

X

Production Capacity

Future market capacity

External

X

Production Capacity

Production shortages

External

Recycling

Recyclability

External

Recycling

Environmental regulation (e.g.
policy decisions, legislation)

External

X

Recycling

Low/impossible recyclability (low
recycling rate, volume, efficiency)

External

X

Recycling

Recycling rate

External

Recycling

Material recovery competition

External

X

Regulation

REACH

External

X

Regulation

RoHS

External

X

Regulation

WEEE

External

X

Regulation

Emission legislation

External

X

Regulation

ELV directive

External

X

Regulation

Dodd Frank Act

External

X

X

External

External

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X
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External

Social Impact

California Transparency in Supply
Chains Act
Conflict elements

External

X

Social Impact

Phosphorous content

External

X

Stock / Reserves

Lack of stock at exchanges,
producers and manufacturers

External

Stock / Reserves

Known stockpiles

External

Stock / Reserves

Stock keeping

External

Substitutability

Market substitutability

External

X

Substitutability

Firm's ability to substitute

Internal

X

Substitutability

Substitutability

External

Substitutability

Potential for substitution

External

Substitutability

Substitutability

External

Substitutability

No substitutes

External

Supplier Risk

High concentration in producing
countries
High concentration in producing
companies
Country concentration

External

X

X

External

X

X

External

Supplier Risk

Availability of resources needed to
mine and produce critical materials
Concentration risk

External

X

X

Supplier Risk

Country concentration

External

X

X

Supplier Risk

Sourcing from different sources
impacts quality
Monopoly supply

External

External

Supplier Risk

Monopoly supply (# of material
sources)
Producer diversity

Supplier Risk

Very concentrated supply chain

External

X

Supplier Risk

Niche monopolistic market

External

X

Supplier Risk

Single supplier available

External

X

Supplier Risk

Limited number of manufacturers
and suppliers

External

X

Supplier Risk

External

X

External

X

Supply

Failure to provide required quality
of materials
Failure to deliver/perform to client
requirements
Percent of world supply used

Supply

Supply risk

External

Supply

Likelihood of disruption

External

X

Supply

Total market availability

External

X

Supply

Likelihood of disruption

External

X

X

Supply

Likelihood of substance becoming
unavailable due to REACH

External

X

X

Supply

Current market balance

External

Supply

Supply reduction risk

External

Regulation

Supplier Risk
Supplier Risk
Supplier Risk

Supplier Risk
Supplier Risk

Supplier Risk

X

X

X
X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X
X

External

X
X

X

External

X
X

X

External

Internal

X

X
X

X
X

X
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Supply

Static reach reserves

External

X

X

Supply

Static reach resources

External

X

X
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6.4.

Example Firm-Level Scorecard

Table 6.4.1. Example Firm-Level Scorecard
Criticality Risk Measurement Tool: Material / Product / Segment A
Profitability
Risk Level
Very High
High
Medium
Low
Very Low

Finance
Revenue
(% of total)

Procurement
Price Volatility
(% change)

Design & Product Concept Viability
Risk Level
Very High
High
Medium
Low
Very Low

Production
Risk Level
Very High
High
Medium
Low
Very Low

Marketing
Price Elasticity

Production
Substitutability

Finance
Material Fraction
of Product Cost
(%)

Procurement
Supplier Risk

Marketing
Segment Market
Share (%)

Production
Material Utilization
(%)

Finance
Gross Margin (%)

Procurement
Inventory Variance
Ratio (%)

Marketing
Supplier Reliability

Production
Production
Efficiency (%)
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Appendix C
7.1.

CEA Methodology Supplemental Information

Table 7.1.1.: Critical Material Composition per Light Bulb (given in grams)
Material

CREE
High Bay LED

Cerium

1.73E-03

Europium

1.28E-03

Gadolinium

1.48E-03

Gallium

5.38E-02

Indium

1.91E-02

Yttrium

7.81E-02
TOTAL:

1.55E-01

Critical material intensity was calculated based on the critical material composition of each
light bulb and the other four key model inputs (population, dietary requirements, growing space,
and lighting requirements). To feed one person for one year under the scenario modeled in this
work would require 12 high bay LED bulbs. To feed the projected world population in 2050
would require approximately 113.2 billion high bay LED bulbs. This is equivalent to 18,473
metric tons of critical materials.
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Table 7.1.2.: USDA “Healthy U.S.-Style Eating Pattern” Intake Recommendations by Volume
(USDA 2015)
Category

Daily
(cups)

Weekly
(cups)

Annually
(cups)

Vegetables: Dark Green

0.21

1.5

78

Vegetables: Red & Orange

0.78

5.5

286

Vegetables: Legumes

0.21

1.5

78

Vegetables: Starchy

0.71

5

261

Vegetables: Other

0.57

4

209

2

14

730

4.5

31.5

1,642

Fruits
TOTAL

Given the types and quantities of food to produce in order to meet the stated dietary
requirements, the amount of growing space can be calculated. This is accomplished by using the
recommended consumption of each crop in pounds, the yield per square foot of each crop in
pounds, and the edible portion of each crop by percentage. For example, the USDA
recommended consumption of dark green vegetables is 1.5 cups per week or 78 cups per year
(2015). To meet half of this requirement with spinach would require consumption of 39 cups per
year. Based on the density of spinach (30 grams per cup), a total of 2.59 pounds of spinach must
be consumed annually. According to the USDA, the edible portion of raw spinach is equal to
72% (2018). This means that, in order to produce 2.59 pounds for consumption, a total of 3.59
pounds must be grown. Using the required annual mass (3.59 pounds in this case), the average
yield per square foot (0.30 pounds for spinach), and the number of annual harvests (6 for
spinach), the amount of required physical growing space can be calculated. To produce half of
the annual requirement of dark green vegetables using spinach would require approximately 2
square feet. Table 7.1.3. lists the growing space needed per person, per year for each crop and
intake requirement in the baseline food production scenario.
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Table 7.1.3.: Total Growing Space per Person, per Crop Annually
Crop

Yield per
Square
Foot (lbs)

Annual
Production
Needed
(lbs)

Harvests
per Year

Yield per
Square
Foot per
Year (lbs)

Growing
Space
Needed
(sq ft)

Broccoli

0.42

17.15

6

15.81

2

Cantaloupe

1.00

252.45

4

16.69

16

Cucumbers

0.25

12.32

6

9.13

2

Eggplant

0.42

11.64

4

7.34

2

Green
Beans

0.50

19.60

6

18.25

2

Kale

0.50

2.51

7

25.55

1

Onions

0.65

20.44

3

6.47

4

Peppers

0.25

57.44

4

4.56

13

Potatoes

0.37

57.48

3

3.81

16

Spinach

0.30

3.60

6

12.31

2

Strawberries

0.80

123.27

3

7.96

16

Summer
Squash

0.40

30.85

7

20.44

2

Tomatoes

0.38

62.53

4

6.84

10

TOTAL

671
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Once the specific types and quantities of food are defined and the amount of growing space is
established, the lighting requirements can be determined. Plants require photosynthetically
active radiation (PAR) to grow and thrive. This type of light occurs specifically between 400
and 700 nanometers on the spectral range and includes purple, blue, green, yellow, orange, and
red light. Plants predominantly use blue, red, and purple rays and, depending on the stage of
plant growth, different colors of light are more and less beneficial. During the seedling stage,
plants need more blue light. During the vegetative stage, plants need more purple light. Finally,
during the flowering stage plants need more red light. This is important because different
artificial light bulbs emit light from different parts of the spectral range, and no current artificial
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light technology can precisely replicate the light emitted from the sun. This means that different
light bulbs will emit light from different parts of the spectrum.
Plants also need exposure to a certain amount and duration of photosynthetic light each day.
This is quantified by two metrics. The amount of light needed to grow plants is a function of the
daily light integral (DLI) (Runkle 2006). The duration of light needed by each crop is a function
of the photoperiod (Runkle 2006). The DLI refers to the amount of light, measured in moles per
square meter per day (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚2 𝑑𝑑). The photoperiod refers to the duration of light, measured in
hours per day (h/d). Different types of crops have different DLI requirements and different

photoperiods. In this study there are two sets of light requirements, one for greens (i.e. spinach
and kale), and one for the other 11 crops which fall into the category of tomatoes, melons, and
vining crops. Crops in the greens category have an optimal DLI of 16 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚2 𝑑𝑑 and a minimum

photoperiod of 14 ℎ/𝑑𝑑 (Runkle 2006). Crops in the tomatoes, melons, and vining crops category
have an optimal DLI of 35 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚2 𝑑𝑑 and a minimum photoperiod of 18 ℎ/𝑑𝑑 (Runkle 2006).

Once the DLI and the photoperiod have been established, the next step is to determine how to

provide the corresponding amount of light needed. In other words, we need to know how much
of the light requirement for any given crop can be provided by one bulb. The light output of
bulbs is reported in terms of photosynthetic photon flux density (PPFD), which is a measure of
the amount of light emitted in a specific area each second (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑚𝑚2 𝑠𝑠). Although manufacturer
specifications for light bulbs aren’t provided in terms of DLI, the DLI can be used to calculate
lighting requirements in terms of PPFD. For example, greens have a target PPFD of 243, and

tomatoes, melons, and vining crops have a target PPFD of 347. Based on manufacturer data, we
know that the CREE linear LED fixture used in our model produces an average PPFD of 805
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑚𝑚2 𝑠𝑠. To provide the target PPFD of 347 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑚𝑚2 𝑠𝑠 required by tomatoes, melons, and

vining crops would require 0.43 CREE high bay LED fixtures per square meter. The final step is

to convert fixtures per square meter to fixtures per square feet. The average PPFD for the high
bay fixture used in the model is 805 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑚𝑚2 𝑠𝑠. Table 7.1.4. lists the number bulbs per crop.
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Table 7.1.4. Number of Bulbs per Crop

Broccoli
Cantaloupe
Cucumbers
Eggplant
Green Beans
Kale
Onions
Peppers
Potatoes
Spinach
Strawberries
Summer
Squash
Tomatoes
TOTAL:

CREE
High Bay
LED
0.3
2.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.4
2.0
1.8
0.0
1.9
0.4
1.5
11.5
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7.2.

Determining Critical Material Intensity of Horticultural Lighting Technologies

Figure 7.2.1.: Determining Critical Material Intensity of Horticultural Lighting Technologies
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7.3.

Mass and Cost of Critical Materials by Lighting Technology

Table 7.3.1. Mass and Cost of Critical Materials by Lighting Technology
Mass / Bulb (g)
HID Metal Halide
T8 LFL
High Bay LED

6.10E-01
1.69E-03
1.55E-01

Critical Material
Cost / Bulb ($)
3.37E-02
7.24E-05
1.31E-02
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Appendix D
8.1.

Price Volatility and Firm Performance
To further understand the dynamic between critical material price volatility and firm

performance, annual and quarterly data was analyzed for three firms that rely heavily on
rhenium: Boeing, General Electric (GE), and Pratt & Whitney (a subsidiary of United
Technologies). Boeing is the world’s largest jet manufacturer, and GE and Pratt & Whitney are
two of the three largest consumers of rhenium in the U.S. (alloy manufacturer Cannon Muskegon
is the third largest). Figure 1 shows the percent change in the annual profit of each firm between
2007 and 2012, relative to the price of rhenium. Figure 3 shows the change in quarterly profit
for each firm over the same time period. The trailing performance of each firm after 2008’s
massive rhenium price spike suggests a negative correlation between the price of rhenium and
profit. This is particularly evident in Boeing’s performance. The impact appears to bottom out
around 2010 when a gradual recovery can be seen for all three firms in 2011 and in GE and
Boeing in 2012.
Figure 8.1.1. Annual Price of Rhenium vs. Annual Profit of GE, Boeing, and Pratt & Whitney,
2007 - 2012
Price of Rhenium vs. Profit
(Annual)
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$ / Ton (millions)
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-30
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2008
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2009
Boeing

2010
Pratt & Whitney

2011

2012

% Change in Profit

15

5

-65

Rhenium
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Figure 8.1.2. Quarterly Price of Rhenium vs. Quarterly Profit of GE, Boeing, and Pratt &
Whitney, 2007 - 2012

Price of Rhenium vs. Profit
(Quarterly)
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-2,000
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Rhenium

GE
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Both the annual and the quarterly data suggest an impact and recovery cycle in which an
initial supply disruption (caused by the 2008 price spike), causes both short- and long-term
damage to firm performance. Within four quarters of the rhenium price spike, GE profit
declined by -81% and Boeing profit declined by -107%. Pratt & Whitney profit also declined,
but more gradually. Within five quarters of the rhenium price spike, Pratt & Whitney
experienced a -28% decline in profit. Volatility persists among all three firms over the 8 quarters
with Boeing showing the greatest variation in performance.
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Figure 8.1.3. Annual Financial Performance of Boeing vs. Price of Rhenium
Annual Boeing Financial Performance vs. Price of
Rhenium
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Figure 8.1.4. Annual Variation in Boeing Financial Performance vs. Price of Rhenium
Boeing Annual Performance Variation
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Figure 8.1.5. Quarterly Financial Performance of Boeing vs. Price of Rhenium
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Figure 8.1.6. Quarterly Variation in Boeing Financial Performance vs. Price of Rhenium
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Figure 8.1.7. Annual Financial Performance of General Electric (GE) Aviation vs. Price of
Rhenium
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Figure 8.1.8. Annual Variation in General Electric (GE) Aviation Financial Performance vs.
Price of Rhenium
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Figure 8.1.9. Quarterly Financial Performance of General Electric (GE) Aviation vs. Price of
Rhenium
GE Quarterly Financial Performance vs. Price of Rhenium
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Figure 8.1.10. Quarterly Variation in General Electric (GE) Aviation Financial Performance vs.
Price of Rhenium
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Figure 8.1.11. Annual Financial Performance of Pratt & Whitney vs. Price of Rhenium
Pratt & Whitney Annual Financial Performance
vs. Price of Rhenium
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Figure 8.1.12. Annual Variation in Pratt & Whitney Financial Performance vs. Price of
Rhenium
Pratt & Whitney Annual Performance Variation
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Figure 8.1.13. Quarterly Financial Performance of Pratt & Whitney vs. Price of Rhenium
Pratt & Whitney Quarterly Performance
vs. Price of Rhenium
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Figure 8.1.14. Quarterly Variation in Pratt & Whitney Financial Performance vs. Price of
Rhenium
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vs. Price of Rhenium
200.00%
150.00%
100.00%
50.00%
0.00%
-100.00%

2007_1
2007_2
2007_3
2007_4
2008_1
2008_2
2008_3
2008_4
2009_1
2009_2
2009_3
2009_4
2010_1
2010_2
2010_3
2010_4
2011_1
2011_2
2011_3
2011_4
2012_1
2012_2
2012_3
2012_4

-50.00%

Revenue (% Change)

Profit (% Change)

100.00%
80.00%
60.00%
40.00%
20.00%
0.00%
-20.00%
-40.00%
-60.00%
-80.00%

Rhenium Price (% Change)

80

References
Achzet, B. and C. Helbig (2013). "How to evaluate raw material supply risks - an overview."
Resources Policy 38: 435-447.
AEA Technology (2010). Review of the Future Resource Risks Faced by UK Business and an
Assessment of Future Viability. London.
AEA Technology (2011). Raw materials critical to the Scottish economy. Edinburgh.
Agarwal, S., J. Ofori and K. Raghavan (2012). Managing rough waters: How to steer a course to
stability with commodity price volatility as the new norm, Deloitte Consulting, LLP.
Agency, E. A. S. (2013). Rolls-Royce plc Trent XWB series engines. EASA Type Certificate
Data Sheet.
Agrilyst, Cornell University, and Urban Ag News. "State of Indoor Farming 2017." Agrilyst.
Accessed April 24, 2019. https://www.agrilyst.com/stateofindoorfarming2017/.
Alonso, E., Gregory, J., Field, F., Kirchain, R. (2007). Material Availability and the Supply
Chain: Risks, Effects, and Responses. Environmental Science & Technology 41(19): 6649-6656.
Anderson, C.S. (2019). Indium. Mineral Commodity Summary, US Geological Survey.
Retrieved April 23, 2019, from https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/indium/mcs2019-indiu.pdf.
Angerer, G., F. Marscheider-Weidemann, A. Lüllmann, L. Erdmann, M. Scharp, V. Handke and
M. Marwede (2009). "Raw materials for emerging technologies: The influence of sector-specific
feedstock demand on future raw materials consumption in material-intensive emerging
technologies." Karlsruhe: Fraunhofer ISI.
Bach, V., N. Finogenova, M. Berger, L. Winter and M. Finkbeiner (2017). "Enhancing the
assessment of critical resource use at the country level with the SCARCE method–Case study of
Germany." Resources Policy 53: 283-299.
Bauer, D., D. Diamond, J. Li, M. McKittrick, D. Sandalow and P. Telleen (2011). "Critical
Materials Strategy. US Department of Energy.": 1-166.
Bauer, D., D. Diamond, J. Li, D. Sandalow, P. Telleen and B. Wanner (2010). "US Department
of Energy Critical Materials Strategy."
Bensch, S., C. Kolotzek, C. Helbig, A. Thorenz and A. Tuma (2015). Decision Support System
for the Sustainability Assessment of Critical Raw Materials in SMEs. 2015 48th Hawaii
International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS), IEEE.
Blechman, Barry M., and David M. Sloss. National Security and Strategic Minerals: An Analysis
of U.S. Dependence on Foreign Sources of Cobalt. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985.
81

Blengini, G. A., Nuss, P., Dewulf, J., Nita, V., Peirò, L. T., Vidal-Legaz, B., ... & Pellegrini, M.
(2017). EU methodology for critical raw materials assessment: Policy needs and proposed
solutions for incremental improvements. Resources Policy 53, 12-19.
Brown, T. (2018). "Measurement of mineral supply diversity and its importance in assessing risk
and criticality." Resources Policy.
Brown, T. J., T. Bide, A. S. Walters, N. E. Idoine, R. A. Shaw, S. D. Hannis, P. A. J. Lusty and
R. Kendall (2011). "World Mineral Production. 2005-09." British Geological Survey: 118.
Buchert, M., D. Schüler, D. Bleher and P. d. N. U. p. l'environnement (2009). Critical metals for
future sustainable technologies and their recycling potential, UNEP DTIE; Öko-Institut.
Buchert, M., Manhart, A., Bleher, D., & Pingel, D. (2012). Recycling critical raw materials from
waste electronic equipment. Freiburg: Öko-Institut eV, 49(0): 30-40.
Buijs, B. and H. Sievers (2011). "Critical thinking about critical minerals: Assessing risks related
to resource security." Polinares EU Policy on Natural Resources. The Hague: Clingendael
International Energy Programme.
Bustamante, M. L. and G. Gaustad (2014). "Challenges in assessment of clean energy supplychains based on byproduct minerals: A case study of tellurium use in thin film photovoltaics."
Applied Energy 123: 397-414.
Cannella, S., A. P. Barbosa-Póvoa, J. M. Framinan and S. Relvas (2013). "Metrics for bullwhip
effect analysis." Journal of the Operational Research Society 64(1): 1-16.
Chapman, P., M. Christopher, U. Jüttner, H. Peck and R. Wilding (2002). "Identifying and
managing supply chain vulnerability." Logistics & Transport Focus 4(4): 59-70.
Cullbrand, K. and O. Magnusson (2012). "The use of potentially critical materials in passenger
cars." Chalmers University, Sweden.
CREE Inc. (2018). "Annual Report 2018." Retreived from https://investor.cree.com/staticfiles/1093a940-b534-47eb-8966-24898912364a.
Daw, G. (2017). "Security of mineral resources: A new framework for quantitative assessment of
criticality." Resources Policy 53: 173-189.
Deloitte Sustainability et al. (2017). Study on the review of the list of critical raw materials
(European Commission, Brussels). Brussels, European Commission.
Department of Defense (2017). Strategic and Critical Materials Operations Report To Congress,
Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics.

82

Duclos, S. J., J. P. Otto and D. G. Konitzer (2010). "Design in an era of constrained resources."
Mechanical Engineering 132(9): 36.
Duclos, S., 2016. Evaluating and Solving Industrial Material Sustainability Challenges. GE
Experiences.
EC (2010). "Critical raw materials for the EU. Report of the Ad-hoc Working Group on defining
critical raw materials." Ad-hoc Working Group: July 2010: 84.
EC (2014). "Report on Critical Raw Materials for the EU. Report of the Ad hoc Working Group
on defining critical raw materials.": 41.
Gambogi, J. (2019a). Rare Earths. Mineral Commodity Summary, US Geological Survey.
Retrieved April 23, 2019, from
https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/rare_earths/mcs-2019-raree.pdf
Gambogi, J. (2019b). Yttrium. Mineral Commodity Summary, US Geological Survey. Retrieved
April 23, 2019, from https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/rare_earths/mcs-2019yttri.pdf
Gardner, L. and J. Colwill (2016). "A framework for the resilient use of critical materials in
sustainable manufacturing systems." Procedia CIRP 41: 282-288.
Gardner, L. and J. Colwill (2018). "A framework and decision support tool for improving value
chain resilience to critical materials in manufacturing." Production & Manufacturing Research
6(1): 126-148.
Gaustad, G., Krystofik, M., Bustamante, M., & Badami, K. (2018). Circular economy strategies
for mitigating critical material supply issues. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 135, 2433.
GlobalData Energy. “Rare Earths: Chinese Dominance Unchallenged despite Newer
Discoveries.” Mining Technology | Mining News and Views Updated Daily, July 16, 2018.
https://www.mining-technology.com/comment/rare-earths-chinese-dominance-unchallengeddespite-newer-discoveries/.
Glöser-Chahoud, S., L. Tercero Espinoza, R. Walz and M. Faulstich (2016). "Taking the Step
towards a More Dynamic View on Raw Material Criticality: An Indicator Based Analysis for
Germany and Japan." Resources 5(4): 45.
Graedel, T., G. Gunn and L. Tercero Espinoza (2014). "Metal resources, use and criticality."
Critical metals handbook: 1-19.

83

Graedel, T. E., R. Barr, C. Chandler, T. Chase, J. Choi, L. Christoffersen, E. Friedlander, C.
Henly, C. Jun and N. T. Nassar (2012). "Methodology of metal criticality determination."
Environmental science & technology 46(2): 1063-1070.
Graedel, T. E., E. Harper, N. T. Nassar, P. Nuss and B. K. Reck (2015). "Criticality of metals
and metalloids." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112(14): 4257-4262.
Graedel, T. E., E. M. Harper, N. T. Nassar and B. K. Reck (2015). "On the materials basis of
modern society." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112(20): 6295-6300.
Graedel, T. E. and B. K. Reck (2016). "Six Years of Criticality Assessments: What Have We
Learned So Far?" Journal of Industrial Ecology 20(4): 692-699.
Griffin, G., Gaustad, G., & Badami, K. (2019). "A framework for firm-level critical material
supply management and mitigation." Resources Policy 60: 262-276.
Gunn, G. (2014). Critical metals handbook, John Wiley & Sons.
Hallstedt, S. I. and O. Isaksson (2017). "Material criticality assessment in early phases of
sustainable product development." Journal of Cleaner Production 161: 40-52.
Hatayama, H. and K. Tahara (2015). "Criticality assessment of metals for Japan’s resource
strategy." Materials Transactions 56(2): 229-235.
Hatayama, H., & Tahara, K. (2018). Adopting an objective approach to criticality assessment:
Learning from the past. Resources Policy, 55, 96-102.
Helbig, C., C. Kolotzek, A. Thorenz, A. Reller, A. Tuma, M. Schafnitzel and S. Krohns (2017).
"Benefits of resource strategy for sustainable materials research and development." Sustainable
materials and technologies 12: 1-8.
Helbig, C., L. Wietschel, A. Thorenz and A. Tuma (2016). "How to evaluate raw material
vulnerability-An overview." Resources Policy 48: 13-24.
Helferich, O. K. and R. L. Cook (2002). Securing the supply chain, Council of logistics
management.
Hendricks, K. and V. R. Singhal (2005a). "An empirical analysis of the effect of supply chain
disruptions on long-run stock priec performance and equity risk of the firm." Production and
Operations Management 14(1):35-52.
Hendricks, K. B. and V. R. Singhal (2005b). "Association between supply chain glitches and
operating performance." Management Science 51(5): 695-711.
Hendricks, K. B. and V. R. Singhal (2007). "The Effect of Demand-Supply Mismatches on
Equity Volatility: An Analysis of Different Types of Supply Chain Risks."

84

Hillman, M. and H. Keltz (2007). "Managing risk in the supply chain: a quantitative study."
AMR Research (January): 1-24.
Investing News Network. (2018, December 06). Rare Earth Elements Prices 101. Retrieved from
https://investingnews.com/daily/resource-investing/critical-metals-investing/rare-earthinvesting/rare-earth-metals-prices/
Jasiński, D., M. Cinelli, L. C. Dias, J. Meredith and K. Kirwan (2018). "Assessing supply risks
for non-fossil mineral resources via multi-criteria decision analysis." Resources Policy 58: 150158.
Jaskula, B.W. (2019). Gallium. Mineral Commodity Summary, US Geological Survey. Retrieved
April 23, 2019, from https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/gallium/mcs-2019galli.pdf.
John, D. (2015). Rhenium--A Rare Metal Critical to Modern Transportation, US Geological
Survey.
Kellner, Tomas. “Up, Up and Away: GE's Billion Dollar Bet on Ceramic Super Material Is
Taking Off.” GE Reports, September 18, 2015. Retrieved from
https://www.ge.com/reports/post/123737823440/up-up-and-away-ges-billion-dollar-bet-on/.
Knobloch, V., T. Zimmermann and S. Gößling-Reisemann (2018). "From criticality to
vulnerability of resource supply: The case of the automobile industry." Resources, Conservation
and Recycling 138: 272-282.
Kolotzek, C., C. Helbig, A. Thorenz, A. Reller and A. Tuma (2018). "A company-oriented
model for the assessment of raw material supply risks, environmental impact and social
implications." Journal of Cleaner Production 176: 566-580.
Lapko, Y., P. Trucco and C. Nuur (2016). "The business perspective on materials criticality:
Evidence from manufacturers." Resources Policy 50: 93-107.
Lee, H. L., V. Padmanabhan and S. Whang (1997a). "The Bullwhip Effect in Supply Chains."
Sloan Management Review 38(3): 93-102.
Lee, H. L., V. Padmanabhan and S. Whang (1997b). "Information distortion in a supply chain:
The bullwhip effect." Management Science 43(4): 546-558.
Lipmann, A. (2005). "Rhenium." Lipmann Walton and Co Ltd.
Lloyd, S., A. Clifton, J. Lee, L. Elghali and C. France (2012). "A framework for environmental
risk management." The Aeronautical Journal 116(1183): 941-961.

85

Lloyd, S., J. Lee, A. Clifton, L. Elghali and C. France (2012). Ecodesign through environmental
risk management: a focus on critical materials. Design for Innovative Value Towards a
Sustainable Society, Springer: 374-379.
Mancheri, N. A., Sprecher, B., Bailey, G., Ge, J., & Tukker, A. (2019). Effect of Chinese
policies on rare earth supply chain resilience. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 142, 101112.
Martha, J. and S. Subbakrishna (2002). "Targeting a just-in-case supply chain for the inevitable
next disaster." SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT REVIEW, V. 6, NO. 5 (SEPT./OCT. 2002),
P. 18-23: ILL.
Miehe, R., R. Schneider, F. Baaij and T. Bauernhansl (2016). "Criticality of material resources in
industrial enterprises–Structural basics of an operational model." Procedia CIRP 48: 1-9.
Mitroff, I. and C. Alpaslan (2003). Preparing for Evil.
Morley, N. and D. Eatherley (2008). Material Security: Ensuring resource availability for the UK
economy, C-Tech Innovation Limited.
Mottura, A. and R. C. Reed (2014). What is the role of rhenium in single crystal superalloys?
MATEC Web of conferences, EDP Sciences.
MSP-REFRAM (2017). Rhenium Production. MSP-REFRAM Final Conference. Brussels.
Nassar, N. T., T. E. Graedel and E. Harper (2015). "By-product metals are technologically
essential but have problematic supply." Science Advances 1(3): e1400180.
National Research Council (2008). Minerals, critical minerals, and the US economy, National
Academies Press.
Nieto, A., K. Guelly and A. Kleit (2013). "Addressing criticality for rare earth elements in
petroleum refining: the key supply factors approach." Resources Policy 38(4): 496-503.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. “Ceramic Matrix Composites Take Flight in LEAP Jet Engine.”
ScienceDaily. ScienceDaily, January 3, 2017.
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/01/170103151742.htm.
Olhager, J. (2003). Strategic positioning of the order penetration point. International journal of
production economics, 85(3): 319-329.
Polyak, D. E. (2017). Rhenium. US Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook - 2015 [Advance
Release], US Geological Survey.
Polyak, D. E. (2018). Rhenium. Mineral Commodity Summary, US Geological Survey.

86

Punkkinen, H., Mroueh, U. M., Wahlström, M., Youhanan, L., & Stenmarck, Å. (2017). Critical
metals in end-of-life products: Recovery potential and opportunities for removal of bottlenecks of
recycling. Nordic Council of Ministers.
Rahman, S. M., Kim, J., Lerondel, G., Bouzidi, Y., Nomenyo, K., & Clerget, L. (2017). Missing
research focus in end-of-life management of light-emitting diode (LED) lamps. Resources,
Conservation and Recycling 127: 256-258.
Ramsey, J., W. East and S. Daintith (2017). 2017 Full Year Results.
Rhee, S. W., Choi, H. H., & Park, H. S. (2013). Performance evaluation of material separation
from spent fluorescent lamps using the thermal end-cutting method. Journal of Material Cycles
and Waste Management 15(4): 503-509.
Rolls-Royce Holdings, plc (2018). Annual Report 2017. London.
Romm, J. (2016, April 2). 5 Charts That Illustrate The Remarkable LED Lighting Revolution.
Retrieved from https://thinkprogress.org/5-charts-that-illustrate-the-remarkable-led-lightingrevolution-83ecb6c1f472/
Rosenau-Tornow, D., P. Buchholz, A. Riemann and M. Wagner (2009). "Assessing the longterm supply risks for mineral raw materials—a combined evaluation of past and future trends."
Resources Policy 34(4): 161-175.
Runkle, E. (2006, November). Daily Light Integral Defined. Retrieved from
https://gpnmag.com/article/daily-light-integral-defined/
Runkle, E. (2015, March). Light Wavebands & Their Effects on Plants. Retreived from
http://flor.hrt.msu.edu/assets/Uploads/Light-wavebands.pdf.
SMM Information & Technology Co, Ltd. (n.d.). Shanghai Metals Market. Retrieved April 23,
2019, from https://www.metal.com/
Schoolderman, H. and R. Mathlener (2011). "Minerals and Metals Scarcity in Manufacturing:
the Ticking Time Bomb-Sustainable Materials Management." London, UK: PwC.
Sheffi, Y. and J. B. Rice Jr (2005). "A supply chain view of the resilient enterprise." MIT Sloan
Management Review 47(1): 41.
Sprecher, B., I. Daigo, S. Murakami, R. Kleijn, M. Vos and G. J. Kramer (2015). "Framework
for Resilience in Material Supply Chains, With a Case Study from the 2010 Rare Earth Crisis."
Environmental science & technology 49(11): 6740-6750.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. (2015, December). Appendix 3. USDA Food Patterns: Healthy
U.S.-Style Eating Pattern. Retrieved from
https://health.gov/dietaryguidelines/2015/guidelines/appendix-3/.

87

U.S. Department of Energy. (2016, September). Revolution Now The Future Arrives for Five
Clean Energy Technologies – 2016 Update. Retrieved from
https://www.energy.gov/eere/downloads/revolution-now-future-arrives-five-clean-energytechnologies-2016-update
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2017). World population projected
to reach 9.8 billion in 2050, and 11.2 billion in 2100 | UN DESA Department of Economic and
Social Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/worldpopulation-prospects-2017.html
"When the chain breaks." The Economist 17 June 2006: 19(US). Business Insights:
Essentials. Web. 10 Oct. 2018.

88

Data Sources
USDA. (2018). USDA National Nutrient Database for Standard Reference. Retrieved from
https://www.ars.usda.gov/northeast-area/beltsville-md-bhnrc/beltsville-human-nutritionresearch-center/nutrient-data-laboratory/docs/usda-national-nutrient-database-for-standardreference/
The Boeing Company. (2007). 2006 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000119312507033902/d10k.htm.
The Boeing Company. (2008). 2007 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000119312508032328/d10k.htm.
The Boeing Company. (2009). 2008 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000119312509022654/d10k.htm.
The Boeing Company. (2010). 2009 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000119312510024406/d10k.htm.
The Boeing Company. (2011). 2010 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000119312511028490/d10k.htm.
The Boeing Company. (2012). 2011 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000119312512048565/d255574d10k.htm.
The Boeing Company. (2013). 2012 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000001292713000014/a201212dec3110k.htm.
The Boeing Company. (2014). 2013 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000001292714000004/a201312dec3110k.htm.
The Boeing Company. (2015). 2014 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000001292715000011/a201412dec3110k.htm.
The Boeing Company. (2016). 2015 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000001292716000099/a201512dec3110k.htm.
The Boeing Company. (2017). 2016 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000001292717000012/a201612dec3110ka.htm.
CREE Inc. (2000). 2000 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000089541900000012/0000895419-00000012-0001.txt.

89

CREE Inc. (2001). 2001 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000095014401506414/g71423e10-k.txt.
CREE Inc. (2002). 2002 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000102140802011139/d10k.txt.
CREE Inc. (2003). 2003 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000119312503054147/d10k.htm.
CREE Inc. (2004). 2004 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000119312504144133/d10k.htm.
CREE Inc. (2005). 2005 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000119312505170616/d10k.htm.
CREE Inc. (2006). 2006 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000119312506179160/d10k.htm.
CREE Inc. (2007). 2007 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000119312507187409/d10k.htm.
CREE Inc. (2008). 2008 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000119312508181391/d10k.htm.
CREE Inc. (2009). 2009 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000119312509177499/d10k.htm.
CREE Inc. (2010). 2010 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000119312510192307/d10k.htm.
CREE Inc. (2011). 2011 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000119312511225630/d10k.htm.
CREE Inc. (2012). 2012 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000089541912000044/cree06242012x10k.htm.
CREE Inc. (2013). 2013 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000089541913000044/cree06302013x10k.htm.
CREE Inc. (2014). 2014 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000089541914000045/cree06292014x10k.htm.

90

CREE Inc. (2015). 2015 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000089541915000058/cree06282015x10k.htm.
General Electric Company. (2007). 2006 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000004054507000017/frm10k.htm.
General Electric Company. (2008). 2007 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000004054508000011/frm10k.htm.
General Electric Company. (2009). 2008 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000004054509000012/frm10k.htm.
General Electric Company. (2010). 2009 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000004054510000010/frm10k.htm.
General Electric Company. (2011). 2010 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000119312511047479/d10k.htm.
General Electric Company. (2012). 2011 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000004054512000016/ge10k.htm.
General Electric Company. (2013). 2012 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000004054513000036/geform10k2012.htm.
General Electric Company. (2014). 2013 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000004055414000023/geform10k2013.htm.
General Electric Company. (2015). 2014 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000004054515000030/ge10k2014.htm.
General Electric Company. (2016). 2015 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000004054516000145/ge10k2015.htm.
General Electric Company. (2017). 2016 Form 10-K. Retrieved from
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000004054517000010/ge10k2016.htm.
General Electric Company. (2009). 2008 Annual Report. Retrieved from
https://www.ge.com/ar2008/downloads.html.
General Electric Company. (2010). 2009 Annual Report. Retrieved from
https://www.ge.com/ar2009/downloads.html.
General Electric Company. (2011). 2010 Annual Report. Retrieved from
https://www.ge.com/ar2010/downloads.html.

91

General Electric Company. (2012). 2011 Annual Report. Retrieved from
https://www.ge.com/sites/default/files/GE_AR11_EntireReport.pdf.
General Electric Company. (2013). 2012 Annual Report. Retrieved from
https://www.ge.com/ar2012/pdf/GE_AR12.pdf.
General Electric Company. (2014). 2013 Annual Report. Retrieved from
https://www.ge.com/ar2013/pdf/GE_AR13.pdf.
General Electric Company. (2015). 2014 Annual Report. Retrieved from
https://www.ge.com/ar2014/assets/pdf/GE_AR14.pdf.
General Electric Company. (2016). 2015 Annual Report. Retrieved from
https://www.ge.com/ar2015/assets/pdf/GE_AR15.pdf.
General Electric Company. (2017). 2016 Annual Report. Retrieved from
https://www.ge.com/ar2016/assets/pdf/GE_AR16.pdf.
United Technologies Corporation. (2009). 2008 Financial and Corporate Responsibility
Performance. Retrieved from http://www.utc.com/Investors/Pages/Annual-Reports-and-ProxyStatements.aspx.
United Technologies Corporation. (2010). 2009 Financial and Corporate Responsibility
Performance. Retrieved from http://www.utc.com/Investors/Pages/Annual-Reports-and-ProxyStatements.aspx.
United Technologies Corporation. (2011). 2010 Financial and Corporate Responsibility
Performance. Retrieved from http://www.utc.com/Investors/Pages/Annual-Reports-and-ProxyStatements.aspx.
United Technologies Corporation. (2012). 2011 Financial and Corporate Responsibility
Performance. Retrieved from http://www.utc.com/Investors/Pages/Annual-Reports-and-ProxyStatements.aspx.
United Technologies Corporation. (2013). 2012 Financial and Corporate Responsibility
Performance. Retrieved from http://www.utc.com/Investors/Pages/Annual-Reports-and-ProxyStatements.aspx.
United Technologies Corporation. (2014). 2013 Financial and Corporate Responsibility
Performance. Retrieved from http://www.utc.com/Investors/Pages/Annual-Reports-and-ProxyStatements.aspx.
United Technologies Corporation. (2015). 2014 Financial and Corporate Responsibility
Performance. Retrieved from http://www.utc.com/Investors/Pages/Annual-Reports-and-ProxyStatements.aspx.

92

United Technologies Corporation. (2016). 2015 Financial and Corporate Responsibility
Performance. Retrieved from http://www.utc.com/Investors/Pages/Annual-Reports-and-ProxyStatements.aspx.
United Technologies Corporation. (2017). 2016 Financial and Corporate Responsibility
Performance. Retrieved from http://www.utc.com/Investors/Pages/Annual-Reports-and-ProxyStatements.aspx.

93

